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 Abstract 
 
 
This thesis attempts to analyze the role that class plays in determining attitudes to gender 
among upper middle class Egyptian Copts. 
Through fieldwork, it explores the relationship between class, religion and gender in the 
lives of upper middle class Christian women. It argues that members of the upper middle class 
share a common ‘class culture’ and have access to ‘cosmpolitan capital’ which is constituted 
largely in social, cultural, educational and linguistic terms, and which sets them apart from the 
broader middle class. A distinctive class culture is produced through gender ideologies 
(described using terms such as ‘open minded’ and ‘educated’) that distinguish the upper middle 
class from other socio-economic groups which enforce different gender norms. This class culture 
and the resources provided by cosmopolitan capital allow upper middle class Coptic women to 
selectively reinterpret some elements of mainstream Coptic Orthodox teaching on gender issues, 
particularly teachings that are not compatible with the kind of gender norms practiced within the 
upper middle class (for example, mixed gender friendships, and romantic relationships prior to 
engagement).  
These selective reinterpretations of gender norms are not rigorously policed by clerical 
authorities; but other areas of contestation between lay elites and church authorities do provoke 
reactions, particularly the struggles over divorce rights.  
Upper middle class Coptic women use gendered symbols (women’s dress, gender 
segregation etc.) to define the boundaries of their class and locate others in a particular class 
framework, showing that ideas about gender remain central to contesting and defining group 
identities. 
 
 3 
 
Contents 
 
Acknowledgements          1 
Dedication           1 
Abstract           2 
Contents           3 
Introduction           5 
 
Chapter 1: Writing about Christians in Egypt      8 
Coptic women: hiding in plain sight        8 
Ethnographies of the particular        9 
Literature review         00 
Defining a Christian upper middle class      01 
Methodology and fieldwork         09 
The insider/outsider boundary       09 
 
Chapter 2: The Production of Culture and Community in Egypt   22 
Defining Copts          00 
Defining a minority         01  
The Coptic revival and Coptic identity politics     02  
Creating an imagined Coptic community      09 
The state and minoritarian discourse       02 
Divorce struggles         00 
Chapter 3: Gender and Community       34 
Gender roles and the Church        01 
 Idealized images - the virtuous wife       09 
 Gender and minoritarian discourse       10  
 
Chapter 4: The Politics of Class        45 
Concepts of class and status        14 
Situating my fieldwork         14 
Upper middle class culture and identity in the lives of my informants   18 
A non-sectarian identity        40 
Anxiety and unease          41 
Class and denominational flexibility       44 
 
Chapter 5: Gender and Class Culture        33 
Gender roles and official church doctrine      24 
Gender and class         28  
 
Chapter 3: Contesting Faith and Discipline       22 
The minority of the minority        41 
Changing denomination        49 
 
Conclusion           81 
Epilogue           84 
 4 
 
 
 
Bibliography           88 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis aims to explore the relationship between gender, class and religious identity 
among Egyptian Christians. Using ethnographic tools, it will argue that class plays an important 
role in the way affluent Christian women interpret gender roles and formulate religious identities.  
Based on fieldwork carried out between 0229 and 0200, this thesis will explore how 
young Christian women from a particular social demographic  – an affluent urban upper middle 
class, with a transnational sensibility created through international travel and residence, 
consumption of Western popular culture and bilingual education – relate to normative gender 
roles, particularly those endorsed by the Coptic Orthodox Church. 
It will argue that the impact of narratives about gender roles on the lives of these upper 
middle class women is very different from their impact on poorer Christian women. Christian 
women who are part of the upper middle class interpret these discourses selectively, in ways 
which allow them considerable freedom of choice and independence – for example the freedom 
to work outside the home, or to socialize with male friends. They typically describe their choices 
as correct interpretations, because they are the product of “education” and being “open-minded” 
– both terms rooted in a particular class culture. 
Class identity therefore provides young Christian women with the freedom to negotiate 
official and popular discourses about gender.
0
 These young members of the affluent upper 
middle class also described religious identities that were not sharply articulated along 
denominational lines, in contrast to lower middle class and working class Christians. 
                                                          
0
 I use the term discourse/discourses to refer to “the act of talking or writing itself;” “a body of knowledge content;” 
“a set of conditions and procedures that regulate how people appropriately may communicate and use that 
knowledge.” Following Foucault, this usage aims at linking “communication, knowledge and power.” Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology, s.v. "discourse." 
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 Recent scholarship has described a process in the second half of the twentieth century 
through which the Coptic community became centralized around an invigorated Coptic Orthodox 
Church.
0
 This “revival” process and the emphasis on a shared Coptic identity that reinforces it 
was a primarily middle class phenomenon. The group of university-educated clerics who led the 
process of revival were products of a new Christian professional middle class, and the 
solidification of communal identity around the Church itself represented a displacement of a 
landed, aristocratic lay elite by this middle-class clergy. 
This revival reflected a wider change among the Egyptian middle classes, who became 
increasingly economically vulnerable in post-Nasserist Egypt as the social bargain fractured, and 
university graduates were no longer guaranteed stable employment for life by the state.
0
  A 
revivified Coptic Church and Coptic community provides a vulnerable Christian middle class 
with social networks, opportunities, economic and social support, as well as religious ministry. 
The urban upper middle classes, however, have had the power to mould their relationship with 
the church as they choose; their existing social and economic capital provides an alternative 
source of security to dependence on a communal identity and a strong church.  
Drawing on this context of a particular upper middle class culture, this thesis will argue 
that young Christian women from this class interpret gender roles and religious identities 
differently, drawing on an upper middle class culture that defines class differences partly through 
different attitudes to female behavior. 
                                                          
0
 Dina El Khawaga, “The Political Dynamics of the Copts: Giving the Community and Active Role,” in Christian 
Communities in the Arab Middle East ed. Andrea Pacini (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 09980 040-092. 
0
 Under Nasser, the authoritarian regime guaranteed Egyptian citizens a minimum standard of living, including the 
provision of employment opportunities and government services (such as healthcare and education), in exchange for 
political support. One of the main beneficiary groups were lower middle class university graduates, who found 
stable jobs for life as part of the rapidly expanding state bureaucracy.  
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It will also argue that gender is a neglected category in discussions about Christianity in 
Egypt and more specifically about Coptic identity. By showing how gender is policed, it will 
reach some conclusions about gender as an important site of identity production. 
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Chapter 1: Writing about Christians in Egypt 
This chapter explores some of the key issues surrounding research on Egyptian Copts, 
such as the paucity of scholarship on the Copts in general and on Coptic women and gender 
issues specifically. It also highlights some of the problems inherent in writing about Coptic 
communities as an outsider given the problematic history of outsiders’ selective interest in and 
deployment of apparent Coptic grievances, and briefly summarizes the methodology of the 
fieldwork, and explains why research was not restricted to Coptic Orthodox members.  
 
Coptic women: hiding in plain sight  
This thesis was initially prompted by twin observations; firstly, the feeling that women 
and gender were critical elements of the debate about Copts and Coptic identity, and secondly, 
that analysis and research on these gendered debates, and Coptic women themselves, were 
curiously absent from much of the academic literature. Recent studies like Saba Mahmood’s 
ethnography of Muslim women in Cairo have presented new models for understanding the 
intersection between religion, politics and gender in the region and particularly in Egypt.
1
 
However, academic literature has focused primarily on Muslim women. Mahmood’s research 
argues that an Islamic women’s movement, embedded in new spaces and employing new 
practices, has been overlooked by many Western feminist scholars who are too preoccupied with 
                                                          
1
 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: the Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, (Princeton University Press, 
0224). 
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searching for signs of resistance to patriarchal norms. Other researchers have followed the 
opposite approach, explicitly examining Muslim women’s religious practices for strategies of 
resistance or proto-feminist leanings.
4
 
Missing from this picture, however, are detailed studies on Coptic women’s experiences, 
from either post-colonial or from liberal feminist approaches. Yet Coptic women in Egypt have 
also experienced this Islamic awakening as external observers of a changing Islamic identity and 
practice which has strongly impacted shared public space and wider Egyptian culture, which they 
are part of.
2
 At the same time, the Coptic Orthodox Church has undergone its own process of 
religious and institutional change, usually termed a “revival”; and the implications of this for 
gender dynamics have not been fully explored.   
 
Ethnographies of the particular  
 This absence of knowledge about gender dynamics in Eastern Christianity has a political 
dynamic. Over the last several decades, scholarship on the Middle East has become more 
reflexive and more sensitive to the problems of knowledge production. Colonialist legacies by 
which the region was categorized according to immutable binaries, rendering it an inferior to an 
equally essentialized Western counterpart, have been reappraised. Labels like “the West” and 
“the Middle East” have been usefully problematized, and many unhelpful paradigms have been 
rejected. 
                                                          
4
 For example, Sofia Nehaoua, “Prédicatrices de salon à Héliopolis: vers la salafisation de la bourgeoisie du Caire?” 
Le Mouvement Social no. 000 (0202): 20-42. 
6 Many of my informants discussed these changes with me, and each had a different narrative and emphasis; Dina 
described a period of time around ten years ago when she was at university, when she noticed a trend towards 
“stricter” religious interpretations among her Muslim friends, which particularly impacted their attitudes towards 
mixed-gender gatherings; others such as Christina talked about her parents’ memories of a Cairo in which women 
did not veil, in comparison with her own experiences. Irene saw the changes in terms of an eschatological trend of 
growing “darkness” that would soon reach an inevitable climax.   
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Some essentialized notions retain their power, however. Lila Abu-Lughod has argued that 
culture “is the essential tool for making the other”,4 having replaced the nineteenth century 
narrative of race as a mechanism for creating “a rigid sense of difference.” She notes that in 
many cases, anti-colonial movements have adopted a “reverse Orientalism” in which local 
culture is reclaimed and celebrated (“A Gandhian appeal to the greater spirituality of a Hindu 
India”),8 and the markers of difference remain unbroken. 
In scholarship on the Middle East, religion often functions as a mechanism for creating 
this sense of cultural difference. 
9
 Discussing anthropology, Ranya Abdel Sayed argues that: “In 
the case of the ‘Middle East’ Islam has often been used as the qualifying trait that distances the 
Other from the West and allows the exoticism necessary to make the area a legitimate subject of 
inquiry.”02 
 Abdel Sayed suggests that one way to avoid the othering process that comes from a focus 
on the apparent Islamic nature of the region is to take up Abu-Lughod’s suggestion that 
anthropologists look to produce ethnographies of the particular and write against essentializing 
notions of culture, in this case by producing work on Egyptian Christians.
00
 Following Abdel 
Sayed, to write about Christians in the Middle East provides a chance to disrupt simplistic 
binaries that essentialise the region as “Islamic” and to problematize categories such as “Arab” 
“Egyptian” and “Copt.” 
                                                          
4
 Lila Abu-Lughod. “Writing Against Culture” in Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present, edited by 
Richard Fox, (SAR Press, 0990),  137-162. 
8
 See above. 
9
 Focus on Islam evokes previous colonial era (and much older) tropes whereby the inherent disorder and 
dysfunction of Islam was accordingly an explanation for the self-evident inferiority of the region. 
02
 Abdel Sayed, Ranya. “Church Politics: A modernist Approach to the Role of the Coptic Orthodox Church of the 
See of Alexandria in Constructing Group Identity Among Egyptian Copts”, (Masters diss., American University in 
Cairo, 0220), 2. 
00
 Ibid., 2. 
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 Analyzing Christianity and gender is a particularly powerful way to disrupt these existing 
binaries and essentialised categories. The essentialisation of Islam and the Middle East is 
produced through gendered narratives and images such as the veiled, oppressed Muslim woman, 
the harem, or the inherently misogynistic Islamic/Arab mind. Studies of gender and Christian 
necessarily complicate this simplified picture.  
 
Literature review 
Abdel Sayed’s judgment that most works on Copts are either “historical or theologically 
apologetical”00 is still largely accurate. Much of the available research treats categories like “the 
Copts” as a single entity, rather than politically and culturally constituted community. 
Some studies that do deal with questions of identity and cultural production include El-
Khawaga, who outlined a Coptic “renewal”, describing the changes in the structure of the Coptic 
community and in the role of the Church.
00
 This process began as both a product of and reaction 
to modernization, in a way that parallels the emergence of Islamist movements.
01
 This renewal 
included a dramatic increase in the number of Copts becoming monks, the reorganization and 
centralization of church life, and the “massive institutionalization”04 by which lay Copts were 
brought into the Church structures as deacons or servers, changing the relationship between 
Church and believer.  
                                                          
00
 Ibid. 0. 
00
 El-Khawaga, Dina. “The Political Dynamics of the Copts: Giving the Community and Active Role,” in Christian 
Communities in the Arab Middle East. Edited by Andrea Pacini (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 0998): 040-092. 
01
 Ibid., 080.  
04
 Ibid., 084. 
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Paul Sedra’s study looks at how the Coptic community itself has been constituted as an 
actor.
02
 Sedra argues that academic studies often focus on the Copts as a symbol and as an 
undifferentiated mass. His article instead describes the community as complex and marked by 
class divisions. Within these “class cleavages”, Sedra locates the roots of different and 
competing narratives about Coptic identity and the place of Copts in Egypt. 
El-Khawaga and Sedra’s research suggests that the Coptic community is a not the 
product of primordial ethnic differences, but rather is politically constituted product of an 
Egyptian encounter with modernity. If books about women in Egypt fail to capture the Coptic 
experience, books about Copts rarely discuss women’s lives in detail. Women are marginalized 
in these pages; confined to a single chapter, or the subject of brief observations that remain 
under-analyzed. 
04
 
One exception to this is Febe Armanios’s article on gender and Coptic Orthodox society . 
In her analysis, she describes various contemporary discourses about women’s expected roles.08 
She also discusses the growing popularity of the image of the female “virgin saint”, who was 
martyred defending her virginity.  
There are a few other works that touch on different aspects of Christian women’s lives, 
such as Pieternella Van Doorn-Harder’s unique monograph on Coptic nuns.09  Van Doorn-
Harder analyses the effect of the Coptic revival on nuns, showing that, like monasteries, 
convents experienced dramatic changes in the middle of the 02th century (she dates the changes 
from the 0922s). She notes some interesting trends, such as the significant numbers of educated 
                                                          
02
 Paul Sedra, “Class Cleavages and Ethnic Conflict: Coptic Christian Communities in Modern Egyptian Politics,” 
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 02, 0 (July 0999). 
04
 Samer Soliman, in his discussion of issues that provoke protests by Copts, talks about  sensitivities within 
Egyptian religious communities to loosing members and notes that “it seems that when the lost member is a woman 
the loss and the triumph are doubled” without exploring this further. Soliman 0229, 014. 
08
 Febe Armanios, " 'The Virtuous Woman': Images of Gender in Modern Coptic Society." Middle Eastern Studies 
08, no. 0 (0220): 002-002. 
09
 Van Doorn-Harder, Pieternella. Contemporary Coptic Nuns, (University of South Carolina Press; 0994). 
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young women taking religious orders, and changes such as the creation of an order of 
consecrated deaconesses in 0990. 
There is also some useful research on Coptic women by contributors to Between Desert 
and City: the Coptic Orthodox Church Today.02 This study builds on Dina El-Khawaga’s work 
on the Coptic revival (and includes a chapter by her), exploring various contemporary elements 
of Coptic Orthodox life and worship. There are some interesting insights in 
Berit Thorbjornsrud’s chapter;00 Thorbjornsrud carried out fieldwork in the El-Salihiyya region 
of Greater Cairo, and she has describes the lives of the lower-middle class and working class 
Coptic women she encountered. She presents some arguments about the links between the 
identity of these women and their public religiosity, and analyses the active involvement of 
female servers in Church. She argues that there is a link between a young woman’s activity 
serving in church and the respectability of her presence in the public space in the eyes of her 
community.
00
 Although inherently limited – as a case study of a particular demographic – her 
research points towards interesting links between official church discourses and the lived 
experiences of certain Coptic women.  
A dissertation by Ereeny Zaki, looking at poor Coptic women in the El-Salaam city 
region of Cairo, provides an interesting contrast to the subject of this thesis – the lives of upper 
middle class Coptic women.
00
 
Although these studies of Coptic women provide useful information, some of them adopt 
the same flawed approach outlined in Abdel Sayed in her study – a failure to problematize the 
                                                          
02
 Nelly Van Doorn-Harder and Kari Vogt, Between Desert and City: the Coptic Orthodox Church Today, (Oslo: 
The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 0994). 
00
 Berit Thorbjornsrud, “Born in the Wrong Age: Coptic Women in a Changing Society” in Between Desert and 
City: the Coptic Orthodox Church Today, ed. Nelly Van Doorn-Harder, Kari Vogt (Oslo: The Institute for 
Comparative Research in Human Culture, 0994), 024-89. 
00
 Ibid., 088-9. 
00
Ereeny Zaki, Poverty, Gender and Religion: A Reflection on the Status of Coptic Women in Poor Areas, Masters 
thesis 0221 
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boundedness of the Coptic community. Zaki’s research is problematic for a different reason; the 
study looks at the lives of poor Coptic women in a way that is embedded in elite discourses about 
feminism, gender and Christianity. She writes that:  
The women in my study display characteristics of subordination and lack of 
awareness of their interests and their needs. During the fieldwork, there were only 
few cases of women who were able to demonstrate high levels of awareness of 
some of the injustices against them as women.
01
   
  
 
Her study replicates the kind of errors that Mahmood had warned against, whereby a 
researcher projects a particular kind of feminist discourse and praxis onto the lives of her 
subjects. In this case, the cultural gap in not between a Western researcher and her third world 
subjects, but instead between Zaki, an Egyptian Coptic woman, and the Egyptian Coptic 
informants she works with. The only difference between the researcher and the subjects in this 
study is the socio-economic factor – she is upper middle class and they are members of the urban 
poor. It is this class element, and its impact on identity and conceptions of gender roles, that this 
thesis hopes to explore. 
 
Defining a Christian upper middle class 
This research project was originally envisaged as a study of members of the Coptic 
Orthodox community only. This approach follows official Church narratives and much of the 
scholarly literature, which present the Coptic Church as “native” and authentically Egyptian. 04 
                                                          
01
 Ibid., 90.  
04
 . The Coptic Orthodox Church describes itself as the authentic location of Egyptian Christianity through an 
unbroken chain of orthodox spiritual authority stretching back to the Apostle Mark’s evangelism in Egypt.  
Until the Council of Chalcedon in 140 AD, there was a single church in Egypt; after this theological schism, the 
Egyptian church split into two – the Coptic Orthodox Church, and the Greek Orthodox Church. The Coptic church 
became the dominant expression of Egyptian Christianity, and today around 92 per cent of Egyptian Christians are 
members, but both churches claimed this legacy as the inheritor of orthodoxy and the legacy of St Mark, and both 
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Other Christian denominations are not perceived as representing “Egyptianness” with the same 
authority.
02
  
Following these narratives, I began my fieldwork with the assumption that a study of 
Christianity in Egypt necessarily required a strict focus on Coptic Orthodox believers, as 
authentic Egyptian Christianity would surely be located there, and encounters with other 
Christian denominations would be as isolated groups of recent converts, engaging in “non-
authentic” religious practices, largely unconnected with the lives of the orthodox faithful, and 
unsuitable for an anthropological approach that seeks “native” informants.  A quote from 
Piernella Van Doorn-Harder’s study on Coptic nuns played over in my mind, from an encounter 
at the beginning of her fieldwork when she had encountered the mother superior of a nunnery: 
She explained to me the Coptic veneration of the saints and expressed her regrets 
that the people of my church, the Protestants, did not venerate the saints…after 
she had disappeared several excited nuns rushed into the room; ummina ra’isa, 
the mother superior, had spoken to me and in spite of my Protestant background 
had approved of me.
04
  
 
This was the kind of attitude I expected to encounter – one which viewed members of 
other Christian denominations (particularly Protestant churches) as problematic and perhaps 
“less” Christian. 08 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
churches to this day maintain a Patriarch of the See of St Mark, with the Byzantine patriarch based in Alexandria 
and the Coptic patriarch in Cairo.  
02
 For example: “The Coptic Orthodox Church can be considered the national Church because of its ancient roots in 
Egypt.” Christine Chaillot, The Coptic Orthodox Church (Paris: Inter-Orthodox Dialogue, 0224) 02. 
04
 Van Doorn-Harder, Contemporary Coptic Nuns, 4. 
08
 The doctrinal differences between the Coptic Orthodox Church and Protestant denominations are significant and 
are considered to be much greater than the differences between Catholic and Orthodox theology (although the 
Coptic Orthodox Church is in communion with neither). Some of the major differences are on the nature of Christ, 
the origin of the Holy Spirit, the interpretation of the seven sacraments, the refusal of orthodox tradition, the 
Protestant belief in salvation through faith alone, failure to venerate the saints, and a lack of belief in intersession. 
(Shenouda :0988)  
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As is so often the case in fieldwork, I found that my initial categorizations were 
inadequate. Following Trotter,
09
 I planned to explore existing social networks rather than 
selecting unconnected individuals, to better situate my findings in an authentic social context. 
Situating my fieldwork amongst lay members of the upper-middle class removed me 
dramatically, almost totally, from the world of Van Doorn-Harder’s abbess and her wary 
distance from Protestantism. I started to find that not only were social networks formed 
regardless of denomination, but even the family networks of my informants often cut across 
different denominations. Most strikingly, I found that the Coptic Orthodox women I was 
speaking to did not follow the rigid lines of denominational segregation in their religious lives, 
either.  
Taking up an invitation to attend a bible study group from Sylvia, a Coptic Orthodox 
friend who knew I was interested in learning more about Christians in Egypt, I was struck by her 
participation in a religious community that was not only operated completely outside both formal 
and informal Coptic Church networks, but also followed an explicitly non-denominational 
approach and included members from a variety of different Christian backgrounds.  
 The study group was starting a new series of sessions when we joined, in the autumn of 
0202, having taken a month’s break for the summer holiday. It was a non-denominational group 
that had been formed by a group of attendees at an “Alpha” course at a large Protestant 
evangelical church in downtown Cairo, Qasr Dobara.
02
 The group, of mixed denomination, had 
                                                          
09
 Trotter II, Robert T. “Friends, Relatives and Relevant Others: Conducting Ethnographic Network Studies” in 
Mapping Social Networks, Spatial Data, and Hidden Populations. Ethnographers Toolkit, ed, Jean J. Schensul, 
Margaret D. LeCompte, Robert T. Trotter, II, Ellen K. Cromley, Merrill Singer. (AltaMira Press 0999), 0- 42. 
  
 
02
 The Alpha course is an introductory course to the basics of Christian belief and practices; it originated in the 
Anglican Church but is expressly non-denominational and is held in churches of different denominations around the 
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chosen to continue their biblical discussions in a regular session, and word of mouth had 
expanded the group from an original five to a current maximum of 01, as those who participated 
invited their friends. Around 04-02 attended each week.  
In the group, according to Dina, one of the informal organizers and a veteran Alpha 
course leader, the “majority” were Coptic Orthodox, with a couple of Protestants (including 
herself) and “very few” Catholics. Although the group had coalesced around an activity by a 
Protestant church (and formulated along Protestant lines), the bible study itself was not officially 
affiliated with Alpha or with Qasr Dobara Church, nor did the group address discuss topics with 
an explicitly Protestant agenda. Dina described to me the way the group avoided differences:  
We have a friend, Mary; she’s very Orthodox, but we never get into things that 
can… make problems…like the saints or Mary. These topics are not discussed. 
We usually discuss things from the Bible.  We just read a paragraph from the 
bible and start discussing it. 
  
Other members of the bible study group showed the same kind of complex religious 
affiliations and experiences; Irene, whom I later interviewed, came from a Catholic family but 
was now evangelically-oriented (but did not like to describe herself as belonging to a particular 
denomination). Youssef, the group’s powerful leading presence, came from an observant Coptic 
Orthodox family and now, like Irene, was Protestant-oriented. 
As I started to meet with other informants, away from the bible study group, I wondered 
if these kinds of patterns would be replicated, and I found that the other women I interviewed 
had similar attitudes and experiences. They had friends and often family members who attended 
different churches; and they too had participated in religious activities outside of their churches. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
world. For information on Qasr Dobara, see Dowell, Anne, “The church in the square: negotiations of religion and 
revolution at an evangelical church in Cairo,” Egypt, Masters thesis 0200. 
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Even Christina, an informant who was strongly committed to her Coptic Orthodox identity, had 
experimented, attending an evangelical service at Qasr Dobara. Several of my other informants 
had gone from one denomination to another, and sometimes back again.  
Instead of encountering the discrete Christian communities I had initially expected, I 
found myself mixing with groups of people who were interested and engaged with Christianity, 
but did not attach much importance to denomination.
00
 Upper-middle class Christians could not 
easily be segregated into denominations, without dividing parents from children, friendship 
groups, social networks, and even bible study groups.
00
  
The rigid boundedness of the Coptic Orthodox community – emphasized in the literature 
- did not seem true for my informants. I found myself rethinking my conceptions about the way 
upper middle class Christians in Egypt experience religious categories, and I was faced with 
several choices. I could have expanded my fieldwork in order to locate and select informants 
with stricter ties to the Coptic Orthodox Church and tradition, and undoubtedly it would have 
been possible to find individuals like this. The young Christians I built relationships with would 
often make distinctions between a “strict Copt” or “very Coptic” and someone who was “not so 
religious”, and I could have sought out contacts using these kind of descriptions. 
 But such an approach felt artificial and would have required that I seek out research 
subjects who conformed to my definitions of authenticity. A more honest approach seemed to be 
                                                          
00
 Various different Protestant missionaries arrived in Egypt in the late 09th and early 02th century, and many aimed 
their efforts at Copts rather than Muslims. Under influence of missionary-founded schools, many Copts did convert, 
including some power and wealthy families, such as the aristocratic Wissa from Assiut. These missionary schools 
had a major impact on the Coptic community, influencing the process of revival and reform by spreading new ideas 
about modernity and about church-lay relationships.  
00
 Mixed-denominational marriages were also fairly common, although I did not have the chance to interview any of 
these couples.  
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to chart the way my expectations, as an outsider, were interrupted by the lived reality of my 
informants. 
 
Methodology and fieldwork  
My fieldwork, conducted between 0202 and 0200, was based on qualitative research 
methods – participant observation and semi-structured interviews. Initially, I built relationships 
with an existing group of Coptic contacts and friends, and I was able to engage in informal 
participant observation of daily lives as well as of specific religious practices and activities. A 
second main stage of participant observation started towards the end of the summer of 0202; a 
contact invited me to accompany her to a bible study group, and I attended the sessions with her 
for several months.  
I started my formal interviews towards the end of 0202, starting with several bible group 
members, and then branching out to other contacts. I focused, in my semi-structured interviews, 
on trying to map out existing social networks as much as possible; for example interviewing 
(separately) two cousins, or two close friends, to try to understand the social context in which my 
informants operated. These interviews were generally recorded, and took place in cafes, or in the 
informants’ homes. I continued my participant observation over this period. 
 
The insider/outsider binary 
 20 
 
 Anthropological research on Christian communities in the Middle East can be difficult, as 
it draws on a particularly problematic history of foreign interference, which complicates the 
already difficult job of the researcher who must be conscious of her positionality and voice.  
European colonial powers justified their actions in the region on the basis of protection of 
native Christian groups, claiming jurisdiction over religious minorities under Ottoman rule. In 
Egypt, colonial rule was marked by a divide and rule approach. The nationalist movement 
explicitly rejected this divisive approach, deploying symbols of religious unity, and many Copts 
were active in the struggle against colonialism. However, Coptic issues remain embedded in 
discourses about national identity and authenticity, rendering them highly sensitive, particularly 
to any perceived foreign agendas or foreign interest. 
 As a non-Egyptian, non-Coptic researcher, studying the Coptic community required that 
I situate myself within this complex network of competing and overlapping discourses. It also 
colored my encounters; I found simply explaining that I was researching Coptic issues would 
often lead Egyptians, both Muslim and Christian, to explain their take on the issues at some 
length. Their explanation was not a response to my purposely vague statement of interest, but 
rather to their assumptions about my opinions (as a foreigner). These responses were so 
remarkably uniform that I started to note down the pattern; upper middle class Muslims would 
usually respond to the topic with a defensive statement about  the lack of conflict between 
Muslims and Christians in Egypt “normally” or “in the past” and the attribution of violence 
today to a few extremists. I never mentioned an interest in studying discrimination, or Islamic-
Christian relations, but many of my Muslim interlocutors assumed that this was my purpose and 
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that they would need to challenge my (presumed) assumptions that Christians in Egypt were 
oppressed by Muslims.
00
 
My findings are the therefore the product not only my own subjective experience as an 
outsider to Coptic and Egyptian culture, but as an outsider, provoking a particular range of 
assumptions and reactions among the people I spoke to. If my encounters were shaped by my 
outsider status, it is worth noting research conducted by those with “insider” status is not 
unproblematic. Ganiel and Mitchell, discussing religious ethnography, argue that insider/outsider 
status is not fixed, and that “one's religious identity is mediated through a host of other social 
identities.”01 Some of the scholarship on Coptic issues does assume a privileged right to speak on 
behalf of research subjects because the author shares a religious identity with them. In fact, 
identities are multifaceted; each researcher is situated in a certain way in relation to the people 
they study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
00
 My sense is that most Egyptians Muslims, even affluent middle class graduates, know relatively little about the 
realities of Christian worship. Anthony Shenoda provides an example when he notes that a Protestant prayer held in 
Tahrir Square in 0200 was widely described in the press and on social networks as a “Coptic mass” - Anthony 
Shenoda, “Reflections on the (In)Visibility of Copts in Egypt,” Jadaliyya, last modified May 08, 0200, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/0201/reflections-on-the-(in)visibility-of-copts-in-egyp.  
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 Gladys Ganiel and Claire Mitchell, “Turning the Categories Inside-Out: Complex Identifications and Multiple 
Interactions in Religious Ethnography”, Sociology of Religion Vol. 24, No. 0 (Spring, 0222), 0-00. 
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Chapter 2: The Production of Culture and Community in Egypt 
This chapter will analyse some of the key debates that surround the definition of 
Copticness, the minority status of the Coptic community, and the relationship between Copts and 
state. It will look at the Coptic “revival”, related processes of change that reformulated the 
church, the Coptic community and the relationship between the two in the twentieth century, 
creating a revivified Coptic identity that focused inward on the community. It will attempt to 
describes these processes of change in class terms. 
 
Defining Copts  
As Paul Sedra has noted, the act of defining a distinct Coptic community is, by its nature, 
political and contentious.
04
 To speak about “the Copts” is to enter into a coded debate about the 
nature of Egyptian identity and the relationship of the Egyptian state to its citizens. 
  Various conflicting and overlapping definitions of Copticness exist in contemporary 
Egyptian society. For some, ‘Copt’ has been reclaimed as a signifier of a kind of Egyptian ethnic 
identity. The reimagining of the Egyptian past in light of the pharaonic discoveries of the 09th 
century has led some (particularly secular Christian elites) to use the word to describe a unique 
ethnicity that all Egyptian natives  share, regardless of religious allegiance. According to this 
view, there are “Muslim Copts” and “Christian Copts”.  
Another interpretation is to use “Copt” as both an ethnic and a religious marker, and the 
autochthonous, authentic Egyptian-ness that it represents is a quality possessed only by Christian 
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 Paul Sedra, “Class Cleavages and Ethnic Conflict: Coptic Christian Communities in Modern Egyptian Politics.” 
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 0200 (0999). : 009-04. 
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Egyptians. Christian Egyptians (Copts) therefore are constructed as a racial and ethnic group that 
is separate from Muslim Egyptians, descended from a glorious Egyptian past (normally the 
pharaonic period). The religious division in society is therefore imbued with an ethnic quality in 
which Christians are Copts and Muslims are Arabs, rendering Muslims the descendants of 
foreign invaders and therefore less authentically Egyptian.   
 
Defining a minority 
Within Egypt, Copts currently make up around 02 per cent of the population.02 
Historically, the Coptic community has been constituted in different ways, with some currents 
emphasizing Copticness as a racial or religious category that separates Copts from other 
Egyptian citizens, and others denying that religious affiliation has any meaning in the public 
space, and preferring to describe it as a confessional identity that is (or should be) restricted to 
the private sphere.  
 In the 0992s, with a resurgent public Islamism visible in public spaces, and concern 
about Islamist violence, the question of Coptic identity and status within Egyptian society was 
again a contentious topic.  In 0990, a proposed conference entitled “The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Minorities and People of the Arab World and the Middle East” 
included the Copts on the agenda and was to be held in Cairo. There was a strong public 
reaction, and a number of key figures, including Coptic Orthodox Patriarch Shenouda III, 
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prominent lay Coptic voices like Samir Morqos, and Muslim thinkers such as Mohamed 
Hasainan Haikal condemned the designation of Copts as a minority.  
 These critics of this conference’s agenda argued that that the division of Egypt into 
Muslim (majority) and Christian (minority) was an inaccurate description of Egyptian society, as 
Christians and Muslims were both Egyptians and religious affiliation was not a relevant way to 
divide the nation.  
 The term minority in Arabic (aqalliyya) can be interpreted to imply lesser status rather 
than numerically smaller, and therefore imply a particular power relationship rather than 
demographic reality. The response, led by the regime and other key stakeholders in the official 
narrative of Egyptian unity such as the Coptic Orthodox Church hierarchy, represented a 
rejection of a threat to an official national unity narrative. To reject the label of minority when 
attached to Egyptian Christians is to reject the implication that religious affiliation affects the 
relationship between citizen and state.  
 Paul Sedra has identified two strands of thought within Coptic society, the “national unity 
strand” and the “persecution strand”. The national unity strand positions “Copts as so fully and 
harmoniously integrated into Egyptian society as to be indistinguishable from Muslims”.04 In 
this discourse, Copts and Muslims have been historically united, particularly against foreign (i.e. 
Western) invaders such as the Crusaders, the French and the British. In contrast to this stands the 
persecution strand which views the Copts as an ethnically separate group from the Muslim 
counterparts, who have suffered at the hands of an Islam-dominated state. 
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 Official discourse of the Mubarak era sanctioned a version of the national unity narrative, 
publically rejecting, as in the case of the 0991 conference, any implications from perceived 
outsiders, that Copts were disadvantaged by their religious status. The Coptic Orthodox Church, 
which had reached what Mariz Tadros describes as an “entente” with the Mubarak regime, also 
sanctioned a version of this narrative, particularly in its interventions on issues relevant to public 
life.
08
  
The vigorous public response by various establishment voices to the proposed conference 
on minorities is a potent example of how any attempt to challenge this state-endorsed 
representation is considered to be a threat – particularly when the discussion is started by 
“foreigners”. The national unity discourse consistently asserts that Copts and Muslims must 
unify against foreign threats and that attempts to frame Coptic identity in other ways are hostile 
to the Egyptian nation.  
Samer Soliman argues in his 0229 article on Coptic protest that, since the incident in 
099091, it has in fact become more acceptable to apply the term minority to the Copts in public 
debate, and to acknowledge that there is a Coptic question.
09
 He quotes a 0222 article by 
Mohamed Hasainan Haikal in which he uses the term minority to describe Egyptian Copts, in 
contrast to his stated position in 0991.  
It may be that towards the end of the Mubarak era, some of the rhetoric had shifted, and 
some sense of difference between Copts and Muslims could be acknowledged publically without 
provoking accusations of sectarianism and treachery; but the main elements of the national unity 
discourse were still deployed to shut down real debate about topics such as sectarian violence, 
religious persecution, legal inequalities and barriers to freedom of worship, etc.  When the so-
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 Mariz Tadros, ‘Vicissitudes In The Entente Between The Coptic Orthodox Church And The State In Egypt 
(0940–0224)’ International Journal of Middle East Studies (0229), 100084. 
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 Soliman, 012. 
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called “Coptic question” is raised, the underlying issues and debates are ignored and the problem 
is concealed by rhetoric. For example, violence against Copts is attributed to Islamist terrorists 
(who are also a threat to wider Egyptian society) or its sectarian dimensions are ignored, for 
example in the 0200 incident in which a Muslim policeman shot six Christians who were 
unknown to him.
 12
 This avoids challenging official narratives that define all Egyptians as equal 
citizens regardless of religion.  
 
The Coptic revival and Coptic identity politics 
 Despite the deployment of the national unity narrative at key moments to shut down 
debate about contentious issues, framing Coptic identity in ethno-religious terms has become 
increasingly dominant with the Egyptian Coptic community. A particular minoritarian discourse 
has taken shape in the second half of the twentieth century, produced and sustained by a 
“revived” Coptic community, centered on the Coptic Orthodox Church. 
 Initial processes of reform and revival within the Coptic community were the result of an 
exposure to Western modernity.  Anthony O’Mahony has characterized this first series of 
changes as the “lay” reform phase. 10 In the 09th century, the Coptic community in Egypt was 
headed by aristocratic, land-owning Coptic families, who, like the Muslim elite of the time, were 
exposed to Western ideas and practices. Under Mohamed Ali, and later under the British 
protectorate, other, non-Coptic Christian denominations started to establish churches and 
communities in Egypt.
10
 These new churches and missionaries began to establish schools and 
educational establishments, which were popular among the Coptic elite, who were then exposed 
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 Egypt Independent, “Governor denies sectarian motivation behind Minya train shooting,” January 00, 0200. 
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to new religious ideas and to new models of Christian practice, hierarchy and priesthood.
10
 This 
exposure led to complaints that the Coptic clergy was “backward”11 and pressure was put on the 
Coptic religious establishment to reform to remedy its stagnation in the face of modernity.  
With the formation of the majlis al-milli (community council) in 0841, the Coptic elite 
had a formal tool for overseeing communal affairs and for pressing for reform. As well as 
supervising the financial affairs of the community, there was an emphasis on educational reform, 
and improving the educational level and overall quality of the Coptic priesthood. Patriarch 
Kyrillos IV (0841-0820), the “father of reform (abu al-islah)” began training programs for 
priests and deacons. Under the reign of his successor, Kyrillos V (0841- 0904), a council scheme 
to form a theological seminary, which would provide clergy for the first time with systematic 
training, was approved by the patriarch and eventually started functioning in 0890 . Various 
charitable and educational associations were also founded, and Coptic schools and hospitals were 
established.  
 In this period, the Western-educated lay elite set the agenda, using the community 
council as a tool to modernize the community. The second “monastic” phase of reform14 would 
result, ultimately in the displacement of the landed Coptic elite in favor of Coptic clerics.  
 This “monastic” revival that started to take place in the early 02th century was a result of 
some of the earlier changes. As part of the movement towards educational reform and 
modernization of the community, Habib Guirgis, an archdeacon who had been among the first 
students at the newly inaugurated theological seminary, created a committee to provide religious 
instruction to Coptic youth.  
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 O’Mahony, 42.  
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 O’Mahony, 42. 
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The committee, which was established in 0908, formed branches all over Egypt, with the 
aim of encouraging the religious instruction of Coptic children between the ages of four to the 
end of high school.
12
 This “Sunday School Movement” attempted to strength the community in 
the face of pressure from other denominations and missionaries.  
The movement was massively influential, providing a centralized, unified model of 
religious education that reinvigorated religious identity, stressing the centrality of the Church in a 
Christian life that had a lasting impact on the Coptic community. 
 One of the results of these educational reforms was the influx of a new group of middle 
class, often university-educated Copts who taught in the Sunday schools before choosing to enter 
the monasteries. Many then went on to join the clerical hierarchy (among them Nazeer Roufail, 
the future Patriarch Shenouda III). 
14
 
 The “monastic” project of reform differed from the lay movements of the late 09th 
century in its aims. Whereas the lay reformers had focused on modernizing and rationalizing the 
community and the church as part of a project to build a modern Egypt, the new middle class 
monastic reformers were concerned with effecting a spiritual revival in a church that was 
threatened by resurgent and sometimes hostile Islamist politics and the presence of other 
Christian denominations. This revival would aim to define a Coptic identity which looked 
inward, focused on family, church and community.
18
 
 The rise of this generation of middle class reformers also coincided with political changes 
that displaced the Coptic old landowning families. After the 0940 revolution, land reforms and 
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subsequent emigration contributed to an increasing marginalization of the former leading Coptic 
families. Kyrillos VI had no allegiances to this lay elite and could therefore build a strong, 
cooperative relationship with President Gamal Abdal-Nasser. 
  
Creating an imagined Coptic community 
 The revival process involved significant institutional reform of both church and 
community, restoring the authority of the church hierarchy and re-centering communal life on 
the church. Control of monasteries was centralized and numbers of bishops and priests were 
increased.
19
 Bishops, who had previously had largely independent control over their dioceses, 
were now subject to more patriarchal oversight. Through a process El-Khawaga describes as a 
“massive institutionalization”,42 the lay community was also brought into the institution of the 
church through an expansion in the number of lay khudaam (servers), who were to assist in every 
aspect of church life. Some within the community contested this expansion, arguing that it 
politicized relationships between the church and the lay community. 
40
 
This generation of reformers enacted a kind of neo-traditionalist approach to create a 
common Coptic identity, based on the proud re-appropriation of a supposedly glorious Coptic 
past. A revival of interest in monastic vocations saw the numbers of monks and monastic 
foundations increase dramatically around the turn of the century. Theological doctrine was 
expressed through a fundamentalist, literal approach to biblical scripture.
40
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These reforms created an “imagined Coptic community” 40 based on a common identity, 
formulated in ethno-religious terms. This community was centered on the church and represented 
by the clerical hierarchy. El-Khawaga describes the process as a “retotalization of meaning”,41 
through which religion became a complete source of identity.
44
  
This neo-traditional Coptic community, centered on the church, was the product of an 
emerging Coptic middle class, and in the post-Nasserite era, it was the Coptic middle classes 
who gained most from the protection of a communal identity and a strong church. This middle 
class – reliant on university education for their status – was hit by Sadat’s economic polices, 
which caused  contraction of the state and its social services, as well as a reduction in social 
mobility.  
The situation of this broader middle class has become increasingly precarious, as 
unemployment figures for graduates remain high. It is this vulnerable group that has embraced 
the new Coptic identity and the protection of a community and church that provides needed 
social services as well as religious ministry. 
 
The state and minoritarian discourse 
 Under Mubarak, the Egyptian state utilized the national unity rhetoric to forestall 
potentially threatening discussion about sectarianism and the relationship of Coptic Egyptians to 
the state. This rhetorical tool, when deployed at the level of public discourse, closes down these 
debates by portraying any consideration of sectarian issues in Egypt as an attack on the nation. In 
                                                          
40
 Omar Foda, “Saintly Soap Operas: An examination of three Coptic saint dramas” Arab Media and Society,  Issue 
00, Winter 0202, http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=420.  
41
 El-Khawaga, 080. 
44
 Social services were increasing provided by the church and by Coptic religious foundations. 
 31 
 
doing so, the regime was supported by the religious establishment of the Coptic Orthodox 
Church. 
 However, despite this strategic deployment of nationalistic imagery, the Mubarak regime 
invested in the emerging minoritarian identity described above. The cordial relationships 
between the regime and the Coptic Orthodox hierarchy are one factor in explaining this.  
Relationships between patriarchs and presidents since the 0940 revolution have 
fluctuated.
 42
 Kyrillos VI offered the regime of Gamal Abdal Nasser complete support on behalf 
of the Coptic community, and Nasser dissolved the aristrocratic majlis al-milli by presidential 
decree, restoring complete control of the community to the religious hierarchy, and effectively 
making the church the mediator between the state and Copts.
44
  
Their successors had a fraught relationship with the state. Anwar Sadat’s decision to 
emphasize the Islamic nature of the Egyptian nation caused Shenouda to struggle with the 
regime, urging Copts to abstain from voting in the referendum on Article 0 of the constitution 
which would make Islamic sharia the “principal” source of Egyptian law and Islam the religion 
of the state, and later staged a public act of defiance in 0982 by withdrawing to a monastery in 
Wadi Natrun and cancelling Easter celebrations. In 0980 Sadat rescinded the presidential decree 
that recognized Shenouda as patriarch and kept him under house arrest at a monastery, where he 
was confined until 0984. 
 After his reinstatement by Hosni Mubarak, the relationship between church and state was 
reshaped; Tadros characterizes it as an “entente”. The patriarch once again became the official 
representative of the Coptic community, and the church supported the regime. Under this new 
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arrangement, the state supported the church hierarchy, for example granting licenses to build 
new churches directly to Shenouda, who would then be able to distribute these among his 
dioceses as he saw fit.
48
  
 The Coptic community was also marshaled by the church to support Mubarak’s political 
projects; Mubarak’s reelection in 0224 was celebrated by the ringing of church bells, which 
“according to orthodox doctrine are only to be rung on the commencement of mass and other 
religious rites.”49  During the 0224 constitutional referendum, which was widely opposed by the 
political opposition, Patriarch Shenouda encouraged Copts to vote and to support the 
amendment. 
22
 
This entente fostered the kind of minoritarian discourse that the Coptic revival process 
had created. By recognizing the patriarch as the official representative and voice of the Coptic 
community, the state endorsed this emerging ethno-religious identity, by which Copts are 
characterized by religion rather than by citizenship.
20
 
 
Divorce struggles 
 One key area of contestation between lay followers of the church and clerical hierarchies 
has been the right of Coptic Orthodox members to seek divorce. In 0908, the majlis al-milli 
outlined eight different grounds for seeking a divorce, including abandonment and irreconcilable 
differences. Pope Shenouda removed most of these grounds, keeping only adultery and change 
of religion, effectively restricting access to divorce.  
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The clerical hierarchy has defended its exclusive right to define grounds for divorce (and 
effectively limit it) as non-negotiable, despite challenges from lay members of the church. The 
church authorities have the power to dictate a particular (conservative) approach to access to 
divorce, and lay members have been unable to bring about change. Some have looked for 
alternatives,
20
 but others continue to contest the church’s authority to dictate divorce policy, 
proposing civil family laws that would remove divorce from clerical authority. These battles 
reflect the wider struggles between the clergy and the lay elite over questions of power. 
After the January 0200 uprising, and with the opening up of political space that followed, 
various currents in the Coptic community have also been reconfigured. A renewed and active lay 
contestation of clerical authority over the divorce issue is taking place. A new campaign called 
the “Right to Life” has escalated the level of open contestation, with public protests against the 
church and threats of mass conversion.
20
 It remains to be seen how the issue will develop as the 
political environment changes; but it seems likely that a reinvigorated laity will continue to 
contest clerical authority around this issue. 
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Ch. 3 Gender and Community 
 
This chapter will provide an overview of official Coptic Orthodox Church precepts and 
teachings about gender roles, and will describe some non-official Coptic narratives about gender. 
It will show how ideas about female behavior and female sexuality are linked to the kind of 
minoritarian discourses and sensibilities identified in the preceding chapter, and using the salient 
example of controversies over “kidnapped” Coptic women, it will show that these group 
identities are often contested using women as symbols.  
 
Gender roles and the Church 
Who does the New Testament say is the head, man or woman? This is mentioned 
in Ephesus, chapter 4, and many times in the First Epistle to the Corinthians. ’I 
want you to know that the head of every man is Christ, the head of woman is man. 
For man is not from woman, but woman from man. Nor was man created for the 
woman, but woman for the man. For this reason the woman ought to have a 
symbol of authority on her head, because of the angels.’ (0Cor. 00: 0, 8-02). 
  
 On  Homosexuality and the Ordination of Women, Patriarch Shenouda 00021 
 
The Coptic Orthodox Church emphasizes a number of different elements when it 
discusses the behavior of its female members. One of the key precepts of the church on gender is 
that men and women are fundamentally different in nature, and are therefore suited to different 
roles. This discourse is supported by reference to scripture, both Old and New Testament, which 
is seen as supporting the view that men and women have different essences and therefore should 
take on different responsibilities. There is also a quasi-scientific element presented in discussions 
about male and female roles. The different natures and capacities of men and women are 
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presented as obvious and manifest through observation of the world and of human 
relationships.
24
  
The differences between men and women in nature necessitates a difference in authority. 
The male-female relationship (particularly the husband-wife relationship) is modeled on the 
relationship of Christ to his church. 
22
 A Christian woman “feels man is her equal without 
forgetting to be willingly submissive to her husband, not out of fear or humiliation but out of 
love and respect for him just as the church submits to Christ of its free will.” 24 
Marriage is seen as a holy union, and the duty of all Copts, with the exception of those 
who choose to follow a monastic vocation. One of the most important purposes of marriage is to 
have children.  The different roles of men and women are important within a marriage; the man 
exercises Christ-like authority, and the woman’s greater emotional sensibilities suit her to 
guardianship of the home and children. Women’s roles as wives and mothers is of paramount 
importance as they ensure the future of the community: 
A woman has great responsibilities. Among these responsibilities, I may mention, 
is having pastoral care for children in order to prepare a new generation for the 
Church. One of our problems is that women have no time to care for their 
children.
28
 
 
 
Rhetoric about the dangers of liberal, Western or feminist interpretations of gender roles 
is common. Women may work outside the home, and are valued as servers in church; but a 
neglect of wifely and maternal duties is problematic for the entire community. In his work on the 
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“virtuous wife”, Shenouda starts his book with the observation that “many speak about women’s 
rights but the more pertinent issue is that a woman is virtuous.”29 This rejection of Western 
values runs through church discourses on sex and gender roles. 
 Sex is a spiritual act, reflecting the spiritual union of the married couple, and is strictly 
reserved for marriage. The topic of sexuality and relationships is an important one that often 
comes up in the official literature.
42
 Sexuality, it is argued, is properly expressed in Christian 
marriage and there are dangers of succumbing to lust which must be resisted for emotional and 
spiritual health. 
 In these discussions about how to avoid sin and how to make the right choices, no 
distinction is made between male and female Christians. The instructions on appropriate sexual 
behavior – no sexual activity before marriage; resisting temptation; the natural experience of 
sexual desire; choosing a partner through prayer and reflection rather than attraction - are aimed 
at Christians of both sexes. Both men and women are seen as being capable of sexual desire, and 
both are responsible for keeping themselves “holy and pure”40 by refraining from sex outside 
marriage.  
 However, alternative understandings of sexuality are common among the Coptic 
community. Pieternella Van Doorn-Harder discusses a different vision of sexuality, in which 
Christian women are evaluated by their sexual chastity in a way that men are not, when she 
describes how women who wish to become nuns are evaluated for their suitability.Van Doorn-
Harder describes how Coptic women are required to vigilantly guard their honor and outlines the 
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strategies used  to achieve this - “confinement”40 i.e. containing the woman within the home as 
much as is possible and “protection” – accompanying the woman when she does leave the house. 
 In this gender schema, which Van Doorn-Harder attributes to “Egyptian society”, Coptic 
women’s sexual virtue is compromised by acting in ways that are considered inappropriate for 
“nice girls”, such as spending time outside the house without good reason, or “kissing or holding 
hands” with a fiancé. 
 Some of these behaviors are proscribed in the official doctrine of the Church; for 
example, Bishop Moussa responds to the question, “why are Egyptians so strict in regards to 
boys and girls talking together?” with the answer: “We are not strict, but cautious, for talking, 
results in phone calls, and phone calls result in dating, and dating may result in harmful sins.”40 
To the questioner who asks if it is okay to have a boyfriend, if she does not do anything wrong, 
he responds: “By having a boyfriend or girlfriend we are leading ourselves into temptation. Let 
your relations be in groups from within the church until the time comes for you to select your 
partner for marriage.”41   
 However, in these official responses, dating and romantic relationships are forbidden as 
they may lead to sin; but they are forbidden for men and for women, and are equally problematic 
for both.  
 In the lived reality that Van Doorn-Harder describes, these proscribed activities are 
problematic primarily for Coptic women. “The responsibility of self-control falls upon the young 
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woman who is eager to keep her reputation as a ‘nice girl’ because her ‘nice girl’ behavior 
enhances her possibilities for finding a good husband.”44 
 In Van Doorn-Harder’s analysis, a “nice Coptic girl” is one who “spends most of her free 
time in church, attending the liturgy, bible studies, social gatherings, and charitable 
activities….When a young woman does something that is considered wrong and loses her honor 
(for example, becoming pregnant before marriage), her shameful behavior is seen to reflect on 
the whole church.”42  
 Women’s virtue, and particularly their sexual honor, is important not only as a 
relationship between the individual and God. At a community level, women’s honor is 
understood to have implications for the honor of the group. Women are therefore subjected to 
particular restrictions and their lives are policed by the church and the community with a greater 
rigor. 
 Van Doorn-Harder is describing contemporary judgments about ordinary lay Coptic 
women; but she notes, when discussing those women who wish to follow the monastic path, that 
the same relationship between individual female honor and the honor of the community exists.  
One elderly woman in the church explained the situation as follows; “A nun has 
to be very sure of her call. It is just like in a marriage. When a girl does not feel 
happy in her marriage and wants a divorce [although this is forbidden in the 
Coptic Church], everybody will say, ‘what did she do wrong? Why did she not 
behave well?’ It always the woman who is to blame.”44 
 
Other manifestations of this policing of female honor include restrictions on female dress 
and on other behavior that is culturally associated with compromised sexual virtue. Coptic 
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women who are not from the upper middle class may be expected to dress “modestly”.48 This 
takes different forms; for the women in Zaki’s study, who are part of the urban poor, this might 
take the form of an abaya or a hijab.
49
 In other environments, women might be expected not to 
reveal lower legs or arms; to wear high necklines, or to wear a one-piece bathing suit instead of a 
two-piece.
82
  
 
Idealized images – the virtuous wife 
 Febe Armanios has explored some of these perspectives on gender within contemporary 
Coptic culture. Her study is an analysis not of official Church precepts or doctrine on gender 
issues, but rather an analysis of how idealized images of women and wives are deployed in wider 
written discourses. She locates a “developing perspective on gender” that deploys “two 
discernible representations of the female prototype”80– the virtuous wife and the virgin saint, 
appearing in the written discourses of the Coptic community. Her study uses a few official 
church sources (including a publication by Patriarch Shenouda) with a focus on lay Coptic 
authors. 
 The idealized virtuous wife who guards the home is not a new idea; Armanios argues that 
this particular image was originally deployed in the late 09th and early 02th century by lay Coptic 
writers as part of an identity politics that viewed modern Copts as inheritors of a pharaonic 
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heritage. For these writers, the virtuous Coptic wife was an essential part of “retrieving the 
hidden/inner essence of the Coptic identity”.80  
Coptic nationhood would be preserved through the Coptic family, and woman would be 
the guardians of the home and family. “She was to police its purity and could achieve spiritual 
cleanliness by attending church, praying and fasting, hence compensating for her husband’s 
expected preoccupation with the outside world.”80 
 Armanios argues that these images have emerged in contemporary Coptic discourse 
(including in official rhetoric) but couched in religious terms, so that the Pharaoh-husband has 
become a Christ-husband, with the same qualities of “authority, domination and control over the 
home”.81 The home now, instead of representing the Coptic nation, is “a perfect spiritual 
sanctum” which is guarded by the Coptic wife.  
She describes this process as the appropriation of older secular images as a result of the 
changing Coptic identity politics of the second half of the twentieth century, and she argues it 
reflects an “inclination by Coptic clergy towards a nationalist, predominantly non-religious and 
modernist rhetoric about the place of gender in the Coptic family” 84 that links the survival of the 
minority community with the “role of its female members.”  
 The kind of contemporary representations of female roles and female sexuality that 
Armanios describes are somewhat different from the doctrinal judgments about sexuality 
outlined above. When Bishop Moussa deals with questions on sexuality, most of his responses 
are addressed to men and to women equally. The responsibility of staying pure is the 
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responsibility of a pious Christian regardless of gender. When he addresses questions about 
sexual desire, or about pre-marital sex, there is almost no specific emphasis on the specific value 
of preserving female virginity or virtue.  
 However, these official discourses do argue that men and women have different natures 
and are designed by God to hold different roles in society. The official literature on marriage 
argues that the wife’s proper sphere is the home, and her responsibility is to home and children, 
and that the relationship between wife and husband will be one of submission to loving authority, 
on the model of the Church’s submission to Christ. 
 The developing discourses on idealized images of Coptic women as virtuous wives 
and/or pious virgins that Armanios outlines incorporate some of these key doctrines while 
refining or ignoring others. The key image of a Christ-husband and a submissive wife is 
compatible with church teachings about marriage; the emphasis on female virginity is located in 
a burgeoning literature on female virgin-saints which “make an aggressive association between 
femininity and flawless virginity.”82  
 
Gender and minoritarian discourse 
 Gender, like ethnicity, is a site where symbolic power may be contested.
84
  Deniz 
Kandiyoti has outlined how nationalist projects in post-colonial states deploy women as “the 
symbolic repository of group identity”.88 This symbolism manifests itself “in nationalist rhetoric 
where the nation itself is represented as a woman to be protected, or less conspicuously, in an 
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intense preoccupation with women’s sexual conduct. The latter often constitutes the crucial 
distinction between the nation and its ‘others’.”89   
In Egypt, gender has been deployed in this way, as a site in which cultural identity is 
contested. Gender symbols are deployed to “reproduce religious boundaries and to signify 
religious differences when used strategically in public discourse.”92 Women become the bearers 
of authenticity and are responsible for the reproduction of the community, and their sexual 
behavior therefore becomes a topic of communal concern.  
 Within the Coptic community, contemporary discourses about gender follow this pattern. 
Armanios shows that certain idealized images, particularly that of wifely virtue, are rooted in 
concern about maintaining the community’s cultural (and spiritual) identity through female 
sexual purity and guardianship of tradition. These images are reflected in the lived reality 
described by Van Doorn-Harder, in the way in which female honor is policed. 
 This deployment of women’s bodies as markers of communal difference is shown in the 
Coptic concern about the rights of unveiled women, who symbolize a Coptic nation under an 
oppressive Islamic regime. In the cases of “kidnapped” Coptic women, communities often 
literally struggle for the control of women’s bodies. When women convert (many Copts assert 
that these cases are forced abductions), communal violence typical erupts as both communities 
assert their right to claim the woman. The case of Wafaa Constantin in 0221 was particularly 
high profile. Constantin was the wife of a priest in a village in Beheira, who disappeared from 
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her family home.  Mariz Tadros argues that Constantin was seeking a divorce after suffering 
from domestic violence,
90
 and that having left her husband, she sought police protection as she 
tried to convert to Islam.
 90
  However, this narrative remains contested; several stories circulated 
among Copts at the time stressing Constantin’s happy family life and the imminent wedding of 
her daughter, implying that she would not willingly have left the family home and must therefore 
have been coerced or kidnapped. 
 The story of kidnapping and possible forced conversion sparked protests over the course 
of several weeks at the Cathedral in Abbassiya. The reaction was particularly vocal because, as 
the wife of a priest, her elopement would jeopardize priestly honor, and her conversion would be 
particularly shocking and controversial. The church hierarchy, empowered by the state to define 
and police the Coptic community, was able to gain access (through a presidential decree) to 
Constantin, and to pressure her not to convert, and she retired to a nunnery. 
 This kind of case illustrates the way in which the church hierarchy, supported by the 
state, is able to police the religious limits of the community. Constantin was not treated as a full 
citizen whose legal rights regarding religion and divorce are defined by the state. Her status as a 
priest’s wife made her case particularly sensitive and high-profile. 
 The church had the right to contest her choice to seek to change her religious identity. As 
Soliman points out “Wafaa was not dealt with as an individual having the right to choose her 
religion freely, but as a member of a community.”90  
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Beyond this “communitarianism” identified by Soliman, and the high-profile nature of 
Constantin’s case, there are many more narratives of “kidnapped women” (or “disappearing 
women”) who are described as being taken away from families and husbands and forced to 
convert to Islam.  
There is clearly a gendered element to these stories; although thousands of men convert 
to Islam each year, it is only cases of women that cause strong public reactions and lead to adult 
citizens being passed from state custody to that of the religious authorities.
91
  
To touch on gender, and women, therefore, is to explore the contested space in which 
group identities are articulated and produced. 
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Chapter 4 - The Politics of Class 
In this chapter, I will introduce some elements of the theoretical framework related to 
class, status and social stratification that will be used to interpret and contextualize my fieldwork. 
Bourdieu provides useful theoretical tools for describing and analyzing the social organization 
and stratification of contemporary Cairo, and the place of the middle classes within this. The 
chapter will then use fieldwork to describe the kind of middle class culture and identities of 
which my informants are part. 
 
Concepts of class and status 
Class is an essential tool for understanding the social and political realities of 
contemporary Cairo. Marx defined social classes in terms of their relationship to the means of 
production, and for Marx, culture was essentially a product of economic power; the ruling class 
reinforced their privilege by creating a ruling ideology. Weber found Marx’s approach to be too 
economically reductive; although he agreed that class was based around relations to the market, 
he also introduced other culturally-based elements to explain social stratification and 
organization. For Weber, “status-honor” could be produced by non-economic elements 
(ethnicity, race, religion, education etc), and he deployed this concept to complicate Marx’s 
reductionist system of three classes derived solely from their relationship to property.
94
 Weber 
“affirmed Marx’s equation of property and power, even while insisting that economic dominance 
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is always culturally mediated in patterns of socialization, lifestyles and discourses of honor and 
prestige.” 92 
 If Weber never explicitly delineated the relationship between class and status,
94
 his 
deployment of elements that can be labeled cultural (ethnicity, religion, socialization, etc.) to 
define, categorise and analyse social groupings and social stratification is helpful for 
anthropological research that attempts to deal with questions of class and identity.  
 In his anthropology of the Nepalese middle class, Mark Liechty notes that Weber’s 
insights are particularly valuable for this kind of research project because of his observation that 
“the middle class relates to economic or productive processes not primarily as sellers of labor 
(workers) or owners of capital (the capitalist elite) but as consumers of goods in the market 
place.” 98 This link between consumption and middle class identity was something I observed 
from my own fieldwork. 
 Bourdieu provides useful analytical frameworks for analyzing social stratification and 
middle class life in contemporary Cairo; in particular his description of the role played by 
symbolic forms of capital, for example, “cultural” capital such as educational experiences, and 
“social” capital such as connections. For Bourdieu, economic capital may be converted into these 
other forms of capital, and in so doing, hierarchies of inequality are concealed behind judgments 
about taste and aesthetic value.  
These analytical categories and concepts provided me with a theoretical framework to 
interpret my fieldwork.  
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Situating my fieldwork 
 
 My main informants were situated within the upper middle class of Cairo – an affluent 
sub-group within the broader urban middle class. Membership of the broader middle class 
membership is not explicitly linked to income; rather, according to Anouk de Koning,
99
 
following Armbrust
022
, membership is “figured primarily in terms of education; To be middle 
class meant having an education, being acquainted with modern institutions, and enjoying a 
‘clean’ life, removed from Cairo’s lower class existence…” (00)020 
The upper middle class that my fieldwork dealt with are the  wealthiest members  of this 
broader middle class. De Koning defines them as “a relatively affluent professional upper-middle 
class whose members are employed in the more international oriented segments of the urban 
economy”.020 
  De Koning builds on Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital to articulate how this sub-
group differentiates itself from the wider middle class: 
  
What most clearly sets these upper-middle class professionals apart from other 
middle class professionals is what I call ‘cosmopolitan capital’: familiarity with 
globally dominant, first world repertoires and standards – for example, fluency in 
English – as well as the ability to participate in conspicuously cosmopolitan 
lifestyles. Whereas the urban professional middle class, symbolized by the 
engineer and the doctor, was the main protagonist of Naserite Egypt, young 
upper-middle class professionals employed in  technologically advanced offices 
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of internationally oriented companies have become iconic of the national 
narratives and projects of Egypt’s new liberal era..”020  
 
De Koning’s term “cosmopolitan capital” describes the cultural resources that defines 
this sub-group, and sets them apart from the broader middle class. These cultural resources are 
clearly products also of economic advantage – for example, private schools and universities are 
expensive and beyond the range of an average family income in Cairo, as are many of the 
consumption patterns that de Koning observes – but they also serve to continue to produce a kind 
of affluence. Young graduates with the symbolic capital of private university degrees, fluency 
with foreign languages and cultural idioms, and the social networks provided by middle class 
socialization, have privileged access to the kind of “internationally oriented” workspaces that de 
Koning describes, and accordingly earn much higher incomes than the wider middle class who 
are confined to less well-paying sectors. 
My fieldwork has focused on the Christian members of this upper middle class sub-
group.  
 
Upper middle class culture and identity in the lives of my informants  
 The upper middle class is primarily an urban group; some families still have connections 
with more rural areas, as in the case of interviewee Michael, whose father and grandfather were 
landowners in the Minya area and held the position of ‘omda021. Michael had not inherited the 
title, although he continued to spend a considerable amount of time in the area taking care of the 
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family business. In general, however, my informants led urban lives, and Michael, who spent his 
university days in Cairo, was now married, and had established a family home in the city.  
 Membership of the upper middle class requires a level of wealth; the financial resources 
of the family must be adequate to provide a comfortable lifestyle for its members and a measure 
of financial stability.  Wealth – and class status – is held by family groups rather than 
individuals. Individuals can break through class barriers, but elite status is usually described in 
terms of family origins – being from “a good family” or “a good background.”  My informants, 
primarily younger members of the affluent middle class in their twenties and thirties, worked in 
salaried professions in the kind of transnational and well-paying private sector workplaces that 
de Koning outlined above; but  most also came from families that hold assets which provide a 
financial buffer, so that salaried income is not their sole source of wealth.  
 My informants were educated to graduate level, and some worked in middle class 
professions that are highly respected in Egyptian culture – physician, pharmacist, engineer. 
Others worked for multinational corporations that had opened offices in Egypt. Both men and 
women were expected to graduate from university and to find appropriate work; Christina, who 
was married and expecting her first child when I interviewed her, hoped to return to her job as an 
electrical engineer at a large corporation at some point, and her aspiration to continue to work 
outside the home after motherhood was fairly typical. Most of my interviewees had mothers who 
had also worked outside the home at various points during their childhoods.
024
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 A key component of upper-middle class life in Cairo is its geography. My informants 
lived in areas (primarily Mohandeseen, Heliopolis, Maadi) that were formerly considered to be 
desirable suburbs where wealthy Egyptians could raise families away from the zahma (over-
crowdedness) and undesirable urban realities of the city center.
022
  
Unmarried interviewees lived with their parents in flats that were often rent controlled, 
under regulations dating from the Nasserist era, rendering them effectively cost-free. Over time 
these formerly exclusive suburban areas have become less exclusive, and the focus of the 
wealthy has moved to new housing developments, established outside the city. These 
communities are marketed as suburban fantasies through advertisements that show wealthy, 
photogenic families escaping from the city, and many of my informants’ families had already 
bought or were planning to buy property in these new developments.  
 The geography of upper middle class life requires access to a private car. Cairo has a 
substantial but incomplete public transport network, and private cars provide the convenience 
necessary to easily traverse an urban environment in which upper middle class social networks 
are widely spread between suburban locations at opposite ends of the city (Heliopolis, 
Mohandeseen and Maadi, for example).  Private transportation also provides the safety of 
segregation from a public space that now feels visibly dominated by an alternative class culture. 
Subsidized gasoline renders cars cheap to run and long car journeys have become an 
expected part of middle class daily life in Cairo. In many cases, private transport is also essential 
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for work, as multinational companies increasingly choose to locate their offices in the new 
developments located outside the city, with few existing public transport networks. Car 
ownership therefore becomes a self-reinforcing cycle; new developments are planned to cater to 
a small affluent section of society that already travels by car for almost every journey outside the 
home, and which values open space and segregation from the realities of congested urban living.  
 Accordingly, most of my interviewees came from households where there are several 
cars; in some cases, each adult member owned a car.
024
 Owning a car is a signifier of wealth, as 
although gasoline is subsidized and cheap, private cars are subject to extremely high sales taxes 
in Egypt, making them a relatively costly item to purchase and reserving the privilege of private 
transportation for the relatively well-off. 
 Another key aspect of the lives of the upper middle class is a shared educational 
background, which helps reinforce a kind of class consciousness. Upper middle class families 
send their children to private schools which market themselves as having foreign curriculums 
and learning styles. Most of my informants attended English-language schools with strong 
British or American influences; a few attended Catholic French language schools. These schools, 
including those formed by Christian missions, accept both Muslim and Christian pupils.  
Private education typically extends to the completion of a bachelor’s degree at a private 
university, although students who had selected certain technical disciplines not offered in private 
universities such as Dina, a physician, were obliged to remain in the public sector.   
 As a result of this education, members of the upper middle class are usually fluent in at 
least one foreign language, as well as Egyptian Arabic. Members of the lower-middle classes 
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also study foreign languages as part of their education (sometimes at less expensive language 
schools), but are rarely exposed so comprehensively.  The comfortable fluency of the upper 
middle class also gives them access to global popular culture. My interviewees and I shared 
cultural references to books, films, popular music, television programs, and a certain kind of 
Western consumerism, and these commonalities were less distinct when I spent time with 
Egyptians from different backgrounds.  
 Another element of this identity was the extent to which the young upper middle class 
have transnational experiences which have shaped their identities. In contemporary Egypt, there 
are many kinds of migrants and many migration experiences; the upper middle class, however, 
are located in a complex transnational space mediated by their bilingualism and their 
consumption of global popular culture. All my interviewees had travelled abroad and almost all 
had done so numerous times. These were generally not permanent relocations – shifts from a 
natal culture to an alien one that might characterize the migration experience of a working class 
Egyptian.  
Nadine’s experience was typical; she had grown up in Dubai, where her parents had 
moved to work, and she was part of a close-knit Coptic Orthodox community there. She visited 
Egypt every summer for extended summer holidays, as well as for other kinds of trips, 
particularly to see extended family. She was fluent both in English and Egyptian (not Gulf) 
Arabic. As a teenager, she had returned to Cairo permanently with her family, and now that she 
was married she was based in Cairo. Some time after our interview, she travelled to the USA 
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(where she also had extended family) in the later stages of her first pregnancy to give birth in the 
country and to ensure her daughter would obtain an American passport. 
028
 
 
A non-sectarian identity 
This shared class culture, and its valorization of cultural distinctions over economic 
realities, had important implications for how young affluent members dealt with religious 
identities. 
 The upper middle class is religious mixed, including both Christian and Muslim families. 
One of the effects of sharing a class identity and class-segregated spaces – the private beach; the 
expensive restaurant; the suburban neighborhood; the corporate office– is that social groups may 
be class-segregated but religiously-mixed. My interviewees had formed friendships at school and 
at university across religious networks and these friendships, along with new connections made 
at work, typically formed the basis for adult social lives. At social events with my informants, I 
rarely came across an all-Christian group, with the exception of family gatherings or religious 
activities.  
 My informants also spoke about this during interviews, describing cross-religious 
friendships. Many also explained to me that friendships with Muslims of a similar background 
were easier than those with Christians from a different social group. Dina, from a wealthy 
Protestant family, described to me her initial experiences studying to be a doctor at Cairo 
university: 
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Dina: “Medical school is not the AUC, it’s not like a very high class..you have all 
the classes.” 
Researcher: “They were mixed?”  
Dina: “Yeah, all my friends were Muslim at first; they were the Maadi crew…” 
 
 
 Many of my informants explained to me, when talking about class, that what they had 
more in common with and found it easier to spend time with Muslims from the same class 
background than with poorer Christians.  The shared class culture was a stronger unifying force 
than religious identity was divisive.  
 
Anxiety and unease  
 The economic privilege that defines the lives of the urban upper middle class is obscured 
by a rhetoric that frames class difference in non-economic terms. My informants rarely described 
Egyptian society using economic qualifiers, and terms like “class” or its Arabic equivalents 
(mustawa’ igtimaya or tabaqah igtimaya) did not come up very often when describing self and 
others, unless I initiated a conversation about the topic. Instead, class differences between self 
and others were usually expressed in ethical, cultural, or educational terms. Egyptians from 
different backgrounds were “ignorant” or “not open-minded”; being “high class” meant being 
from “a good family” or being “the right kind of people”. 
 These kind of cultural distinctions reflect a kind of class anxiety that draws on memories 
of a bourgeois existence in pre-revolutionary Egypt, destroyed by Nasser’s socio-economic 
policies. These economic changes allowed some limited social mobility, and new groups were 
able to access wealth. Some members of the professional middle classes were able to find work 
in the Gulf and return to Egypt wealthy, but without the socialization processes described above. 
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The Egyptian ‘nouveau riche’ have acquired the economic standing to intrude onto protected 
bourgeois space, and their doing so caused my informants to feel anxious. 
During a 0202 trip to a private resort development on the north coast (for several 
generations, the holiday destination of wealthy Egyptians during the hot summer months), I 
found myself walking along the sand with a group of Coptic friends, as we tried to find a shaded 
spot. Our visit was in September, after the rush of the high season, so the beach was not 
particularly busy but there were small groups of people already laying their towels on shaded 
patches of sand. The group I was with continued to pace along the sand, ignoring inviting empty 
spaces adjacent to these parties of beachgoers. I couldn’t understand why we kept walking in the 
sun past empty shaded spots. My companions struggled to explain to me that they were seeking a 
space adjacent to the right kind of people. It was difficult for them to articulate a process that 
they did not need to verbalize to each other; and it was a struggle for me to understand why the 
other beachgoers were being rejected. They used phrases like “they’re not the right kind of 
people,” or “they don’t look nice” to explain their reasoning. 
After settling down in a spot that the group agreed was suitable, I asked my companions 
to explain more about their choice. A male friend told me that if we sat next to the wrong sort of 
people, the men might stare at the female members of our party, who were wearing two piece 
swimsuits and other kinds of beachwear, and make them feel uncomfortable.  But we had not just 
passed young men; we had also walked passed a couple of family groups made up of veiled 
women or women in various kinds of Islamically-modest beachwear. My companions found 
these groups just as disturbing; the presence of women on the beach wearing hijabs was as 
discomforting as the presence of men who might behave inappropriately. 
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Asked to explain why a woman in an Islamic bathing suit and a headscarf was a 
problematic sight, my companions would explain that “it doesn’t look nice”; “she shouldn’t be 
here”; and the middle-aged female relative who had accompanied her adult children and their 
friends on the trip explained to me that it didn’t use to be this way when she used to go on 
holiday to the beach; women used to look “nice.” “Even the Muslim women?” I asked, as this 
was an all-Christian group. She looked shocked. “Of course. This is a new thing.”  
This encounter – and other similar experiences – happened on a private beach, at an 
exclusive resort. The same kind of anxiety and conflict was repeated in other privileged spaces 
which my informants were forced to share with Egyptians who had economic privilege, but 
whose dress and behavior marked them out as not from “the right family” or not “open-
minded”.029 
It is not surprising that an identity that is particularly associated with the middle classes – 
the new Islamic piety that reiterates modesty and sexual segregation – is looked on with disdain 
by large parts of the upper middle class, both Muslim and Christian. Knowing how to dress 
(which clothes to buy; what styles to adopt; which hairstyles to choose; avoiding the hijab or at 
adopting a loose style matched with more expensive imported brands of clothing that 
differentiates from the brightly colored, man-made fabrics of the young middle class women) 
involves a visual symbol that articulates not only religious cleavages, but also competing cultural 
identities. My informants were explicit in their discomfort around symbols of a resurgent Islamic 
piety that seemed to be not only invading the public space, but undermining a shared cultural 
project built on ideas about modernity.  
                                                          
029
 This approach is not exclusive to Christians; many restaurants and nightclubs restrict access, not to Muslims, but 
to women who conform to a particular Islamic dress code, i.e. the hijab. 
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Class and denominational flexibility 
 This upper middle class culture provided the context in which I carried out my fieldwork. 
The bible study group that I attended and observed operated in this context. Dina, one of the 
group leaders, explained how the group was created, after several of the members had completed 
a course at an evangelical church in Cairo: 
Dina: We needed more time to talk and discuss um, issues, kida, spiritual things. 
So Youssef, one of the leaders in the group suggested that we start a bible study at 
his place so that we can have more time to talk about different things and discuss 
stuff. That’s how we started. 
Researcher: Okay. When was that? 
Dina: That was almost a year ago. 
Researcher. Okay. So it was just for people on the course or you invited others? 
Dina: Then we started inviting others. With just five, and then everybody started 
to invite friends and now we’re 01, but not everybody’s commited. Not 
everybody comes. We’re about 04, 02 every time. 
Researcher: Are you still meeting in Maadi or you… 
Dina: Um yeah, we used to meet a week in Maadi and a week in Mohandeseen, 
because some of the people were from Maadi and some were from Mohandeseen 
and Zamalek, but now I think it’ll be just Maadi. 
 
  
The group had no explicit membership criteria, beyond curiosity about the Bible and a 
willingness to commit to regular attendance; but the members of the group were nevertheless 
part of a cohesive upper middle class group. The geography of the group expresses this clearly. 
Members, in Dina’s summary, live in the elite suburbs of Mohandeseen, Maadi and Zamalek. No 
lower middle class Shubra residents or working class Copts from Haram have found their way to 
the meeting, because the group has been formed by drawing on existing social networks (i.e. 
social capital).  
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The meetings also rely on some unstated rules to function; in particular, a lot of English 
was used during meetings. Initially, I was concerned that my presence as a foreigner had 
disrupted group’s established pattern, and there were certainly initial attempts to make me feel 
comfortable through translation, despite assurances that it was unnecessary; but observing 
subsequent sessions, I felt more confident that the code-switching between English and Egyptian 
Arabic was an authentic representation of the linguistic patterns of the members of the group. 
One of the practices of the group was to read the Bible verse being examined in both English and 
Arabic, to ensure full comprehension by members of the group; and I noted that several, perhaps 
most of the members brought English language bibles rather than Arabic. Full comprehension of 
the group’s session seemed to me to be restricted not to those who spoke English or Arabic, but 
rather to those who spoke both.  
 If the socio-economic status of the group members was uniform, the denominational 
backgrounds were diverse. The leaders of the group were mostly Protestant (or Protestant-
oriented) and the idea for the group had taken shape when some of the members came together 
on an “Alpha” course at Qasr Dobara evangelical church. In this form, however, the bible study 
group was quite open; most members were Coptic Orthodox and there didn’t seem to be any 
agenda pushing members towards Protestant activities or Protestant interpretations.  
 The presence of so many Coptic Orthodox members at a bible study that was not only 
outside formal church structures, but was associated at least informally with Protestant religious 
activities, surprised me. Why did my informants not choose to attend a similar activity within the 
Coptic church? The church provides a vast range of religious and social activities for every 
section of the community, including bible studies, igtim’aat (religious meetings) for women, for 
young people, for newly married couples, for graduates. Why had these young Coptic Orthodox 
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members chosen to drive across the city to attend this meeting, when they could have gone to a 
similar activity at their local church instead?  
Class seemed to me to be an important part of the explanation. The group had been 
formed from existing social networks and awareness spread solely by word of mouth, creating a 
tiny community of peers. The shared social background created a comfortable atmosphere for 
exploration, debate and questions.    
In one session that explored the concept of Christian discipleship, group leader Youssef 
told a story about persecution. Instead of drawing on the obvious examples of Egyptian 
persecution in the modern era, or on the lives of the saints, he illustrated his point with an 
account of a Russian Christian sent to Siberia under communist rule because of his faith. Telling 
global stories rather than local ones could be a politically distancing effect to avoid raising 
controversial debates about Egypt; but this was a private, trusting environment of close friends. 
Instead, there as a sense of Christianity as a transnational rather than a local identity. The focus 
of Youssef’s interest was not national; it was the global.002  
A year later, during a trip to Canada, I attended a Coptic mass at a church in the suburbs 
of Toronto, and I was reminded of Youssef’s Siberian example. The priest, giving a sermon in 
Egyptian Arabic, told a story about a man who lived in Shubra, whose behavior carried a lesson 
about relationships with neighbors. I felt the same sense of displacement. Youssef’s story (in 
English) had ignored the local context in favor of emphasizing a global Christian narrative about 
persecution. In Canada, the priest had deployed Egyptian images to make a point to a 
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 Youssef’s migrant background and experience may partially explain why he chose to use this example. However, 
I found a lot of elements of his religious discourse, including this global focus, somewhat reflected in interviews 
with Bible study attendee Irene, who had lived in Egypt her entire life, but travelled regularly to attend international 
(usually evangelical) Christian events such as camps, meetings, conferences etc.  
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congregation thousands of miles away from the country – the Egyptian experience had taken 
priority over any local specificities.  
Interviewing Youssef solidified some of these thoughts about locating Christian identity 
in a global context. His parents were Coptic Orthodox, and he had been raised in Holland. As an 
adult with a loose sense of Christian identity, he moved to London and lived an unsatisfying “life 
of regret” which was transformed by a moment of spiritual clarity when he was invited to a bible 
study group.  He spoke to me at length about his spiritual transformation and he was confident in 
his new calling to help others reach Christ and understand God.  
Smartly dressed and articulate, he spoke English with a faint and hard-to-place accent. He 
had been in Cairo since 0228 , living in Maadi and working for an oil company, and had been 
involved in setting up the first Alpha course in Egypt. I asked him about his religious identity, 
and he was reluctant to define his denomination. He termed himself “a follower of Christ” rather 
than a Copt, but said that the “Coptic church was a huge element in telling people about the 
truth.” 
 After learning more about Youssef’s background, the story of the persecuted Soviet 
seemed to be clearer. It fit into this kind of transnational vision of Christianity; a global struggle 
rooted in an eschatological battle not against the crude political realities of the Egyptian public 
space, but as part of a much wider struggle for salvation and for knowledge of God in a world of 
darkness. 
000
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 Irene, who was raised Catholic but referred to herself as “a daughter of the king” rather than with a 
denominational category, reminded me of this focus when she told me during our interview that although Muslim 
suffered from their lack of self-worth, the sexual permissiveness of the West that she saw when she travelled abroad 
was equally bad for women.  
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 Youssef’s story seemed to me to be punctuated by encounters between Egypt and these 
global sensibilities; as a young boy living in Holland and speaking Arabic and English but not 
Dutch, or as a young man living in London, in love with a non-Egyptian woman his parents 
would not accept, and finally as a wealthy professional in Maadi, discussing his calling to bring 
people to Christ with the same confident, professional authority that he applied to explaining his 
consultancy career.  
 As I continued in my fieldwork, I found that the kind of denominational mixing I had 
observed in the bible study group was a feature of many of my informants’ lives. Just as the 
Coptic Orthodox attendees had found something valuable in a non-denominational bible study, 
many of my other informants did not fit into strict denominational categories.  
There was a social element to this that I had not expected; social networks were not 
structured around denomination. I had expected to locate discreet communities of Protestants, 
Catholics, Copts etc. who might interact in some limited ways but were bounded by these 
categories.  Instead, my informants were situated in complex networks that were not structured at 
all around denomination. Denomination did not form a dividing line in relationships, and did not 
seem to provide an important identity marker for most of my interviewees. Many, perhaps most 
of my informants had family members who belonged to a different church.  
 As a result of these mixed social networks, many of my informants had participated in 
religious activities outside their church. Denominational mixed social groups led to 
denominationally mixed religious activities.  
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 This kind of fluid approach to Christian identity and practice was obviously linked to 
class.
000
 These Coptic Orthodox members shared a common class culture with non-Coptic 
Christians, and were not as reliant on the Coptic Church. They have the freedom to explore 
spiritual options outside the Church with limited censure.   
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 Dina, the Protestant women from Maadi, told me that in her experience, some Coptic Orthodox treated 
Protestants as though they were “not Christian” or “worse than Muslims.” The exception, however, was “the open 
minded people.” 
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Chapter 5: Gender and Class Culture 
This chapter will look at the responses of some of my informants to key ideas about 
gender, and analyze what role ideas about class and about religion play in forming these ideas. It 
will also discuss other ethnographic work that has examined the lives of Egyptian Christian 
women and show how these ethnographic studies support the contention of many of my 
informants, that class is a major factor in determining women’s roles.  
 
I think Christian women have more freedom than Muslim women. I know I'm not 
going to get divorced just one day because my husband just decided that. He's not 
going to go marry someone else. (Interview with Christina) 
 
I interviewed Christina, a Coptic Orthodox woman in her mid-02s, in her apartment in 
Mohandeseen. She was heavily pregnant, and rested her hands on her stomach as she talked to 
me. I had met her several times before, as she was part of the extended family of some of my 
friends and interviewees. Less than a year earlier, I had attended her wedding reception in a 
ballroom at a luxury hotel on the Nile. I had felt conspicuous in my plain cocktail dress, 
surrounded by women wearing extravagant ball gowns.  
Christina talked to me about her religious upbringing. She was educated at a private 
Catholic girls’ school, which had around 22 percent Muslim pupils and 12 percent Christian. 
Most of the Christian girls were, like her, Orthodox, with a few Catholics and “very few” 
Protestants. Her mother had attended the same school, and her grandmother before her, and 
Christina told me that she would like a daughter one day who could carry on the tradition.   
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She spoke to me about her religious practices. She had grown up in a family that made a 
point of attending church every weekend, together, and she considered this to be an important 
routine and something that she wanted in her marriage. “That's the one thing that I wanted in my 
house, and I prayed so badly that I'd have it.” When she first met her husband Amir, he did not 
have the same approach to attending church every week.  
We fought so many times about this…and he's like you can't impose… it doesn't 
mean you're a better person because you go to church every Sunday.  And then I 
tell him no, it's not about being a better person, it's something I want for my 
family. 
 
After they had married, Amir’s attitude to going to church had changed: 
 When we got married things got a little easier; he felt somehow responsible, you 
know, he's responsible for this house and he started to get used that we go every 
Saturday. And now whenever  I'm lazy, he's like, we didn't go, let's go. We never 
go on time because that's a problem I have with him, but we try. But right now, 
thank God, we go every Saturday, and we go and we see families that have their 
babies, and I think, yeah, that's what I want. 
 
 For Christina, church was a valued part of her weekly routine; it was important spiritually 
to attend, and she valued the emotional and spiritual experience of the ritual and of confession.  
  Apart from attending weekly services, Christina also used to attend a weekly church 
group for graduates at her church, but had stopped because the sessions were on Friday 
afternoon, disrupting the Friday-Saturday weekend. But in the period leading up to her wedding, 
she and her then-fiancé had joined a group meeting at their church, specifically for engaged 
couples. 
The weekly group sessions comprised of a maximum of 02 people. Under the supervision 
of the priest, different sessions were led by different speakers. As well as providing religious 
guidance on marriage and on relationships, the sessions provided quasi-scientific tools for 
 65 
 
understanding and managing relationships, such as sessions devoted to personality assessments 
and compatibility.   
 
We discussed men are from Mars, women are from Venus. And we talked. One 
time it was about what happens in the ceremony of the wedding. One time we 
discussed sex, and how it's different for men and for women…. 
One time we took something called the DISC analysis…it 's a scientific thing were 
they give you like a text,  01 questions, how do you describe yourself.. You get 
letters, tells you each person's pros and cons, you do it and your partner does it so 
you know what conflicts you're going to have…so khalas you know he's going to 
be around people, you like being the leader, he's always late…this took two 
sessions….One time we talked about parents, our relationship with the in-laws, 
what should be done…. 
 
The priest himself gave the session on the Coptic Orthodox marriage ceremony and the 
meaning behind it. Two young female psychologists– both, like Christina, AUC graduates – led 
sessions on psychological compatibility. Both were young Coptic Orthodox women.  For the 
session on sex, a married couple talked to the group.   
The topics covered and the approaches taken in the class, according to Christina’s 
account, seem to be in harmony with the kind of official ideals about gender roles outlined in 
Chapter 0. Notions of gender complementarity are an integral element of the marriage values 
that the weekly meetings promoted. 
We talked about the role of the man and the woman…how in Christianity, the 
man is the head of the house, and the woman should say yes to the man, but it's 
not an imposed thing, and it should be done in love….And one time we discussed 
the financial. We discussed how in Christianity it's our money, because we tend to 
live in a Muslim environment where a woman can work or cannot work and the 
money's hers, and the man does not have to know about it, and he's fully 
responsible for the house, and she can spend her money on shoes or on her… or 
whatever, but in Christianity there is no such thing as my money and how much I 
make and how much you make it's our money and how much we make. 
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 Christina’s views about marriage reflected ideas about gender roles that the Church 
endorses. She believed that men and women should hold different roles because of their different 
natures, and this situation had to be explored and explained before embarking on a commitment. 
She was enthusiastic about her experiences at the meetings and told me that she always 
recommended the sessions to other engaged couples.    
I think it helped us a lot in our engagement period. We avoided so many things 
that could have gone wrong…because you know, men do that..and because we 
both attended and we both put our heart into it….and when you know the 
fundamental thing is that Christ is in the house, that's the number one 
thing…when Christ is not the foundation of your house it 's going to fall down. 
 
In Christina’s view, Christian marriage did not mean strict, uncompromising obedience to 
a Christ-like husband. She explained to me that it was a three-way relationship between herself, 
her husband and God.  Husband and wife had different roles to play, because they had been 
given different natures - but this was a loving division of responsibilities based on mutual 
respect, rather than a hierarchy of power. In one of her weekly sessions, the couples had been 
taught the correct way to handle finances. In contrast to Islamic practice, under which wives are 
entitled to financial support from husbands and any income they generate from employment 
remains their own property, income was to be shared equally. Christina viewed this positively; 
marriage was a joint project and both spouses would contribute and share what they had, as part 
of a statement of joint responsibility. In Christina’s words: 
The concept about the money…I feel like I 'm there I'm in the house, I'm doing 
something, we're together in this, you're not bigger than me, you're not better than 
me, you know? I feel that, I don't know, the church has given the woman a very 
good…I don't think there's a difference between a man and woman in the 
church…They have different roles because of their different nature, but no one is 
bigger than the other. 
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Gender roles and official church doctrine 
 Christina was a religious person, committed to the Coptic Orthodox Church, who talked 
to me at length about the importance to her of her relationship with God, and of including God in 
her marriage.  
 Her views on marriage and relationships incorporated some of the basic official doctrines 
that the Coptic Church endorses, but not all. Her interpretation of these doctrines (and implicit 
rejection of some) seemed to me to be a product of her upper middle class background. Upper 
middle class culture has a particular gender framework with specific expectations about female 
roles and about marriage. Christina’s views were therefore quite different from the popular 
rhetoric about female sexual virtue and behavior outlined in Chapter 0. 
  The notion of gender complementarity was an important foundation for her in 
understanding her marriage. Her weekly church meetings had emphasized the different natures 
and roles of men and women, and accordingly of wives and husbands, both through theological 
explanations and through Western popular psychology (using books like Men are from Mars, 
Women are from Venus).  Christina agreed that men and women have different natures and 
approaches to relationships, and she valued the sessions because they provided both spiritual and 
psychologically to re authoritative ways to deal with this reality, and to understand her husband 
and build a strong marriage.   
 However, Christina’s interpretation and experience of complementarity had not led her to 
fully embrace the “virtuous wife” model. In her view, different gender roles were inevitable, but 
the marriage would be built on an equal partnership of mutual respect, love and responsibility 
(“no one is bigger than the other.”) In place of the authoritative “Christ-husband” that some 
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modern Coptic authors envisage, Christina saw her marriage as a three-way relationship between 
herself, her husband and God. 
 In particular, the images of marriage that Armanios examines in the first part of her 
article emphasize that the key division between wife and husband is that the wife is responsible 
for the home, and the husband is the one to bear the burden of the outside world. This does not 
preclude women’s employment or women entering the public space; but wives who do so must 
never neglect their guardianship of the Coptic home. 
 
Gender and class 
 Christina’s social class had a major impact on her views about gender roles and on the 
realities of her life as an Egyptian woman. She, like all of my upper middle class informants, was 
able to enter public space without compromising her honor or her family’s respectability. She 
was not subject to the confinement/protection strategies that Van Doorn-Harder describes in 
Contemporary Coptic Nuns. Freedom of movement is provided by private cars, and these women 
typically move through socially-segregated space that is quite geographically disparate – like my 
informants who journeyed from their workplaces or their homes each week to assemble in a 
private flat in Maadi for bible study.  
 Likewise, for Christina and her husband Amir, there was never a question of asking a 
priest to find them a marriage partner. They had no need to do so because they interacted in a 
social environment that was not segregated, and female virtue was not considered to be 
compromised by social interaction with men. She met Amir through mutual friends, and they 
spent time together getting to know each other and building a romantic relationship, before 
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discussing engagement.   Just as Christina had not needed a respectable excuse to leave her 
house, she did not need to use church networks to find a partner.  
 Romantic relationships were not taboo among my informants; some had boyfriends and 
many had had them in the past. The Coptic Orthodox establishment has forbidden dating, as it 
may promote sexual activity, and enjoins young Coptic members to socialize in groups to avoid 
temptation.
000
 My informants discussed the issue of class in relation to gender freedoms with me 
and most argued that, in general, lower socio-economic status resulted in less freedom for 
women and more “closed-minded” or “conservative” approaches to dating, to women’s clothing 
and to women’s roles in general. Upper middle class women like Christina ignore warnings 
against dating and relationships before marriage, as they do not conform to upper middle class 
gender norms.    
 Christina was also encouraged to go to university and to seek out a well-paying job at a 
multinational firm afterwards. She studied engineering at the American University in Cairo (a 
male-dominated major, she told me) and had worked as an engineer at a major 
telecommunications company. She planned to continue working at some point after the birth of 
her first child.  
 Zaki writes as an upper middle class Coptic woman, who had connected with her 
informants through a welfare program organized by her church in Heliopolis. She commented on 
the differences in the participation of women in the religious life of the communities, noting that 
in El Salaam, women are “recipients of the services rather than the participants” and, in contrast 
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 Bishop Moussa, Youth Concerns.  
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to churches in “upper class communities”, they are not allowed to give speeches to the 
congregation at public meetings.
001
 
The gender roles that Christina sought to conform to were influenced by her upper middle 
class status – her interpretation of official doctrines was colored by her experiences of middle 
class culture, with its expectation of how women should behave. Accordingly she expected to 
work without restriction from her father or husband, and possibly to do so after having children. 
She embraced some elements of the gender complementarity discourse endorsed by the church, 
and found these explanations to be useful tools in helping  her build a solid marriage. However, 
as a member of the upper middle class, her responsibilities towards the home could be 
discharged easily through hiring domestic help. The confinement/protection strategy had no 
place in her life and she was able to enter the public space freely. 
She had been free to socialize in mixed-gender groups, and she had made relationship 
choices that she considered uncontroversial (although they were officially discouraged by the 
church), by choosing her partner after a period of dating. She aspired to a marriage of mutual 
love and respect, rather than one characterized by subservience or obedience. 
 Christina’s selective approach to official church discourse on the behavior of female 
members is not purely about contestation. Her experiences suggest that the religious 
establishment, or perhaps some individual churches, are also selective in how they deal with their 
congregations. The religious meetings that Christina attended did not contest her lifestyle; they 
did not stress that pre-marital dating was wrong and that partners should be selected through 
church networks. Nor were there sessions that stressed the obligations of the virtuous wife to the 
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home, above and beyond her participation in the public sphere. In fact, the meetings were led by 
a priest in cooperation with two psychologists – young, educated, upper middle class women – 
so they were a product not only of the church but of upper middle class culture as well. 
 If gender roles are interpreted selectively and through a filter of class culture by female 
members of the church, it seems that the church itself tailors its approaches to fit the needs and 
aspirations of an upper middle class congregation. There is some negotiation with these 
privileged lay members, as the church does not seek to rigidly enforce a particular set of gender 
norms.  
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Chapter 3: Contesting Faith and Discipline 
This chapter examines how some of my informants contested gender norms, and how 
others explicated what they viewed as unjust or erroneous beliefs about gender by associating 
them with either other Christian denominations or with Islam or Middle Eastern values. It will 
argue that this upper middle class group has, in most cases, freedom to change denominations 
and to experiment with a variety of forms of Christian worship, and in the case of one of my 
informants, this process was prompted by a dissatisfaction in what she saw as unfair and unequal 
treatment based on her gender. It will argue that the symbolic capital of this group means that 
young members, including young female members, have relative freedom to leave their 
churches; but this spiritual freedom does not extend to conversion to Islam. 
 Many, perhaps most, of my female interviewees expressed some dissatisfaction with or 
opposition to some part of the conservative gender ideologies in Egypt, which contrasted with 
their “open-minded” attitudes. They consistently attributed practices and beliefs on gender that 
they viewed negatively to the impact of either Islamic or “Eastern” culture. These practices or 
beliefs, even when practiced by Christians or endorsed by Christian churches, were never 
considered to be valid religious interpretations. Rather, those who practiced them were 
religiously mistaken, according to my informants.  
Protestant and Catholic informants also applied this othering process to the Coptic 
church; when confronted by ‘closed-minded’ approaches to gender, these approaches could be 
labeled a result of contamination from the Coptic Orthodox church (itself exposed to the 
corruptive influence of Islam or Middle Eastern culture). 
Dina, the Protestant physician from Maadi, told me that:  
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Being a Christian, makes you have more of the Western culture; you’re not, like 
very Eastern, you don’t have this mentality. I mean, I have guy friends...The 
Orthodox church, some of them have this mentality of, Eastern mentality, it’s 
more… they have Sunday school after …y’anni, massalan like 00, 00. They start 
separating guys from girls. It was not like that at Protestant church. So all my life 
I was with guys, so it’s okay for me to have guy friends and to go out with them 
for coffee. 
  
In Dina’s view, Christianity is associated with a “Western” mentality, and Protestant 
Christianity better embodies this than the Coptic Orthodox church. To define this Western 
mentality, she discusses gender roles – specifically gender segregation. 
 
Dina also explained that this Western/Eastern element was affected by class: 
 
In Maadi, I mean even my friends who go to St Mark’s Church, it’s an Orthodox 
church, but they have a different mentality, different than St Marks’ in Shubra004 
for example. They are open minded. No separation between girls and guys, they 
go out as a group, so it’s about bardu the place. So Maadi, Masr El-Gedida 
[Heliopolis], Zamalek - these churches are different, but Shubra for example, 
Alexandria, they are very strict, they are very eastern, they have some of the 
Islamic culture. 
 
I asked her to tell me more about the topic and she explained the difference in terms of 
dress.  
They won’t wear kida [pointing to her own bare upper arms] I mean, some of the 
Christians would rather have short sleeves, but like this [she indicated her elbow]. 
They wouldn’t wear kida, they wouldn’t wear leggings, they wouldn’t wear um, 
swimming suits, some of them….In Shubra, I’m not talking Maadi of course. 
 
In Dina’s view, the Coptic Orthodox Church had a more “closed-minded” approach to 
gender, a product of its Islamic and Eastern environment, but her Orthodox friends from Maadi 
and from other upper middle class areas were able to resist this conservatism. Clearly Dina finds 
it hard to articulate the precise boundaries of class and religion when describing different 
                                                          
004
 Shubra is a middle class suburb in Cairo with a high proportion of Coptic Orthodox Christians. It is considered 
less affluent than areas like Mohandeseen, Heliopolis and Maadi. 
 74 
 
attitudes to gender; although she attributes more conservative attitudes to dress etc. to religion, 
she also acknowledges that class (being from “Maadi” and not “Shubra”) outweighs these 
religious differences.
002
 
 I was passed Salma’s details by a friend who knew that I was looking to interview 
Christian women. Salma had a friendly manner and she talked animatedly. She was a 09-year-
old university student, who had been educated in a French language Catholic school. She had 
grown up in a Coptic Catholic family, and continued to attend the French-speaking Catholic 
mass, in memory of her father who used to take her to church with him and who had recently 
passed away. She also, however, attended services at Qasr Dobara Evangelical Church.  
Like Dina, Salma described a relationship between the Coptic Church, Eastern culture, 
class and conservative gender attitudes. She told me that: “the Orthodox are less open-minded,” 
compared with Protestants and Catholics, but that Catholic churches in “poor areas” are closed-
minded and that the Orthodox church in Masr El-Gedida [Heliopolis] was more open-minded.  
Many of her Coptic friends would dress conservatively, unlike her: 
They don't often wear shorts. I wear them if they are taking me with the car. And 
when I'm on vacation, I wear a mayo [swimsuit]; I don't wear a bikini because I 
have a bad body, but I would wear one if I was in shape. But my friends wear 
shorts under the mayo. 
 
The minority of the minority 
Nadine, also a university student, was introduced to me by Salma. I initially spent some 
time socializing with the two of them in a mixed-gender, mixed-religion group. Salma was 
anxious to point out to me a Muslim friend of hers who she had until recently been dating; she 
had ended the relationship because she felt that he was too conservative and controlling.  
                                                          
002
 My perspective as a researcher is that class culture, not religion, typically defines this group’s attitudes to dress, 
segregation, dating, etc, but my informants often intertwined the two as Dina does here, talking about Coptic 
Orthodox members from Shubra who belong to both a different denomination and a different class. 
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I felt both Salma and Nadine looked at me somewhat differently from my other 
informants. The six or seven year age gap between us seemed to create something of an aura of 
confession and supportive friendship. As with all my interviewees, I introduced the topic of my 
research as broadly as possible (Christian women and gender roles in Egypt) to create an open-
ended conversation for my informants to respond according to their own interpretation. Nadine 
and Salma were the only interviewees who discussed these issues in a framework of justice. 
Salma talked about the problems in her relationships caused by Egyptian men (both Muslim and 
Christian) who were overly controlling, and her frustrating encounters with male friends and 
colleagues who considered themselves superior to her because she was a woman. Bearing in 
mind Abu-Lughod’s warning against romanticizing resistance004 and framing answers according 
to a Western feminist typology, I generally tried to avoid questions or lines of enquiry in 
interviews that framed the issues in reference to power, resistance, rights and so on. But Salma 
herself wanted to discuss with me her frustration about how women were unjustly treated in 
Egyptian culture, and her struggle against “closed-minded” people and men who tried to control 
her. At one point, she told me that she was interested in “women’s rights” and wanted to work in 
the field one day. 
Nadine struck me as serious and perhaps slightly reserved when I first met her. I had 
joined Salma and some of her friends at a pub in Zamalek. As others continued to talk amongst 
themselves, Salma moved the chairs around and invited Nadine to sit with us as a trio. Nadine, 
on learning that I was researching Christian women in Egypt, lit a cigarette and told me that she 
would definitely like to speak to me about her experiences being what she called “being the 
minority of the minority.” 
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 Lila Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power Through Bedouin Women” 
American Ethnologist vol. 04, no. 0 (Feb., 0992), 00.  
 76 
 
I encountered many informants who were generous with their time, and took it as a 
responsibility to assist me in my research. But Nadine and Salma were different in that they were 
both genuinely interested in the possibility of a discussion, and during my interviews with them, 
they both asked me questions about my opinions on the topic of women and power.  
Nadine was equally serious when I met her at a coffee shop in downtown Cairo for an 
interview. She had driven herself from Maadi, where she lived with her family. We sat in the 
smoking section and she lit a cigarette, and we started to talk. Just like Salma, she told me that 
the people in her church – the Orthodox – were “less open-minded”. Men were allowed to 
smoke, but girls were not. “It’s Egypt,” she said. 
Nadine was unhappy with a recent experience at her church. She told me that she had 
“almost been kicked out for talking to guys.” During the breaks in the igtimaa’ (religious 
meeting), she would go out and talk to the male servants.  “Someone would come to say hi, ask 
me about my father” and they would chat, and she had begun to be the subject of gossip because 
of her conversations with the male servants. She seemed to find the hypocrisy of the situation 
frustrating.  “They don’t think it’s proper at church to talk to guys, but then, the servants who 
talk about us, they’re the ones who eventually date my friends.” She told me that it was “more 
important when you’re a girl, how people talk about you,” whereas “everything's acceptable for 
guys.” 
Nadine’s church seemed to have enforced a more strict gender code than some of the 
other churches described by my informants. This code also extended to socialization with 
Muslims.  A priest had approached Nadine and summoned her to confession. “He told me… 
people are saying stuff about you in church, so I want you to come.” After hearing her confess, 
he spoke to her about reports that she had been seen with Muslims: 
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He said ‘you’re going out with Muslims, you have a Muslim group,’ and I said 
yeah, we don’t discuss religion; religion is private. And he said, eventually you 
will convert, you’ll do bad stuff. He said he had his own statistics of the 
percentage of Muslims who smoke…like 94 percent to 4 percent of Christians.” 
She laughed a little. “He’s supposed to be someone who really gets it…gets 
what’s going on…because he has to give good advice…And he said it’s not 
acceptable, because they want you to come to the religion...They have the concept 
of numbers. They want bigger numbers. In some ways it’s true, but you cannot 
judge a person according to that. 
 
 
 After this encounter, Nadine left her church. She said that no one at the church wanted to 
talk to her, because of her bad reputation. The same thing happened to five other girls who used 
to socialize with groups of Muslims friends. “No one really accepted us. One of them, she stayed 
home, and she said, ‘I’m not going to churches.’ And I went to a different church.” 
Nadine chose to start attending a Catholic church. She had attended a variety of different 
churches during a period spent in the USA, and had particularly liked an “American” [Protestant] 
church. But she felt that attending a Protestant church would be too provocative. “If I go there, 
everyone’s going to gossip.” And she told me that she liked the fact that the Catholic church 
shared similar kinds of rituals to the Coptic church.  
Her experience at the Egyptian Catholic church was radically different from that of her 
Coptic church. “When I go into church, during the mass … everyone turns around to look at you, 
look at what you’re wearing..everything...but when I went to the Catholic church, I go in and I 
walk all the way to the front rows, without being stared at.” 
The priest treated her differently. “I went to confess, and I said I smoke…I had alcohol, 
and the priest said, it’s alright, everyone has their own mistakes. Smoking is just like having the 
bad habit of needing coffee in the morning. It’s just a psychological addiction. It has nothing to 
do with sex.” The priest had provided Nadine with the kind of support and acceptance that she 
had found lacking at her Coptic church. 
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Her sister had told her a story about Pastor Sameh of Qasr Dobara Evangelical Church, 
which she repeated to me. He had given a lecture on homosexuality, and he said that “it’s fine to 
be like that…if that’s how God made you…it’s the same as if you have an affair , if you’re 
straight and you have an affair…it’s the same as being gay.” The Protestant churches were 
“open-minded. They accept new things.”  
 I asked Nadine how her parents had responded to her changing religious choices.  She 
had been reluctant to tell her father (her mother had passed away three years ago)  the extent of 
her problems at the Coptic church, because she was worried he would overreact and start 
arguments, worried that she was being talked about. He told Nadine that she could attend 
Catholic services but could not convert, and although she argued with him that it was “still 
Christianity”, he was strict on this point. 
Her father was not “conservative” but was very conscious of “how people look at you,”, 
for example permitting Nadine to smoke at home, but not in the public space. 
Nadine had challenged some of the practices that her particular church enforced. She had 
rejected the gender segregation that the church hierarchy and her church congregation attempted 
to enforce, because she did not agree with it. She argued that it was a product of a conservative 
mentality. 
 She told me about another incident which highlighted, to her, the frustrating attitude of 
her old church community. Several years ago, she and a friend had applied to become servers in 
church. “I went there and filled the application and four days later, they came to me and my 
friend, and they said no… they didn't tell us the reason. We insisted on knowing and the guy 
eventually said, ‘we saw you eating chicken on a Friday. How can you be a servant when you do 
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not fast?’ ”008 The comment was “ridiculous”; and it characterized the kind of intrusive 
judgementalism that she found unjust and spiritually and emotionally unsatisfying.  
 Like Dina and Salma, Nadine linked this attitude, and the unfair treatment of girls in 
comparison to boys (“No one ever talks about the guys,”) to the Coptic Orthodox Church’s 
“conservatism” “strictness” and “closed-mindedness” which was linked to its contact with 
Eastern culture and with Islam. 
 She recalled a meeting with a Coptic nun, who had asked her if she smoked and “I said 
yes; she said, it's okay, we all make mistakes.” Nuns may be less judgmental, she thought, 
because they were relatively insulated from Egyptian culture.  
 
Changing denomination 
Nadine was not the only interviewee I spoke to who was raised in one church but 
regularly attended services somewhere else. Salma now split her time between Qasr Dobara, 
where she had friends and felt comfortable, and mass at the Catholic church that her father used 
to take her to. Youssef, the leader of the bible study group, was born into an observant Coptic 
Orthodox family and now was more comfortable describing himself as a “follower of Christ”. 
Irene, who described her faith as a personal relationship with God and was reluctantly to define 
herself by denomination,
009
  was raised Catholic, and her mother had been born Coptic Orthodox 
but had converted for marriage. Both Dina’s parents were practicing Protestants, but both had 
been baptized in the Coptic Orthodox church and then converted. 
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 Coptic Orthodox members are expected to abstain from meat and dairy products on every Wednesday and Friday, 
excluding Pentecost season. 
009Although I would situate Irene and Youssef’s refusal to favor a particular church within a broadly evangelical 
Protestant tradition that emphasizes an individualistic spiritual relationship with God. 
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Although there are constraints on conversion, particularly from parents and families who 
were uncomfortable with spiritual exploration (Youssef and Nadine’s parents fall into this 
category), these young upper middle class Christians have considerable freedom to reshape 
religious identities based on their personal choices. 
002
 
However, this denominational flexibility does not extend to leaving Christianity and 
becoming Muslim. Legally, Christians are able to do so in Egypt, but this possibility was not 
discussed by my informants and none expressed any interest in experimentation with Islam.
000
 A 
few touched on the topic of mixed marriages. Dina said that she knew many Muslim-Christian 
couples during her time at university, but that none she knew of had ever chosen to marry. In 
fact, mixed marriages were most common among the “lower classes”. She had heard many 
stories of poor Coptic women being convinced to marry Muslim men “because they’re not very 
religious; they care for things more than religion, like just the basics. Love and food and a place 
to live.” 
 Although the line between different Christian denominations and identities was very 
fluid, the dividing line between Christian and Muslim was, in the imaginations of my informants, 
unbreachable. While the increasing emphasis on Coptic identity in Egypt has not prevented 
young upper middle Copts from looking outside the Coptic community for alternative spiritual 
experiences, the Christian-Muslim binary remains absolute in the lives of these upper middle 
class Christians.  
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 Protestantism was considered particularly problematic by many of my interviewees; Nadine chose to attend a 
Catholic rather than a Protestant church partly because this would provoke less gossip. Christina told me that she 
would have considered marrying a Catholic partner but probably a Protestant would have been difficult because 
Protestantism is “very different.” 
000
 An interesting contrast with the high number of conversions Zaki recorded in her thesis. 
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Conclusion   
 
This thesis has argued that class identity and class privileges play a role in the way 
affluent Christian women interpret gender roles and religious identities. 
My informants were part of an urban upper middle class, defined by shared transnational 
and educational experiences, and by the physical segregation of different socio-economic classes 
in Egypt. Socio-economic divisions are reproduced starkly in the lived realities of members of 
the upper middle class, through the geography of their urban lives. 
 Suburban developments, private education, exclusive leisure spaces, private transport, 
are all isolating elements that ensure that extended, meaningful social contact with people from 
different socio-economic backgrounds is limited. Members of this group possess a 
“cosmopolitan capital” which is constituted largely in social, cultural, educational and linguistic 
terms, and which sets them apart from the broader middle class. In this way, the economic power 
of this group is reproduced culturally through the maintenance of a particular class culture.  
One of the ways that this class culture is produced is through gender ideologies that use 
terms like “open minded” and “educated” to distinguish the upper middle class from other socio-
economic groups that enforce different gender norms. Use of these value judgments conceals 
economic privilege behind perceived cultural or moral superiority. 
 This class culture allowed my Coptic Orthodox informants to selectively reinterpret 
church teachings and other popular discourses about gender.  Their rejection of teachings that 
were not compatible with the kind of gender norms practiced within the upper middle class (for 
example, mixed gender friendships, and romantic relationships prior to engagement) was 
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formulated as a rejection of “closed-minded” or “conservative” thinking – not of Christian 
doctrine. 
 This selective appropriation of ideas about gender was mirrored by a degree of selectivity 
by some elements of the Coptic religious establishment. Some priests seem to have more “strict” 
interpretations of certain teachings than others.
000
 Christina’s church in Zamalek seemed to 
provide interpretations of official doctrines that would appeal to its upper middle congregation – 
in contrast to Nadine’s experience of frustration at being judged by her church community and 
priest for associating with Muslims and for talking to male friends in church.   
 That my informants seem able either to avoid elements of church teaching that are 
incompatible with their lifestyles (Christina) or to challenge community and clerical authority by 
seeking out religious environments that they found more emotionally and spiritually satisfying 
(Nadine) suggests that they are not part of the same “imagined Coptic community” that has come 
to define the middle class Coptic experience. They feel a stronger sense of community and 
belonging with other upper middle class Egyptians from different religious backgrounds than 
with fellow Copts from the less affluent families.  
Within the upper middle class, it seems that the bounded, inward-looking nature of neo-
Coptic identity does not have the same power; instead, the Christian community is constituted 
around a common Christian identity, rather than around a common Coptic Orthodox identity. 
Denominational divisions are observed but do not seem to be rigid social barriers. Religious 
exploration, within Christianity, is socially acceptable, and in many cases does not provoke 
sanction or criticism. Interestingly, despite this denomination fluidity, the Christian-Muslim 
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 Zaki suggests that churches in poorer areas exclude their female members from some kinds of participation. 
 83 
 
binary remains absolute. Christian-Muslim marriages among my informants’ social circles were 
reported to be extremely rare. Likewise, my informants’ spiritual exploration was always within 
the boundaries of Christianity. None of my informants were interested in Islam as a possible 
spiritual alternative. This suggests to me that, whilst the power of the Coptic Church to police the 
community is somewhat weaker among upper middle class members, the wider division in 
Egyptian society –the Christian/Muslim binary – still retains its power. My informants’ 
‘cosmopolitan capital’, which had displaced or muted the power of a bounded Coptic Orthodox 
community, did not have any impact on their identification as Christian. 
Overall, my research suggests that class remains an important factor for determining the 
religious identities and gender roles of upper middle class Coptic women. My informants’ power 
to select, interpret, reject and reformulate certain elements of expected gender roles seems to be a 
reflection of the power of upper middle class culture. However, it should be noted that this power 
is not unlimited; there are non-negotiable issues, particularly access to divorce, where the 
church’s teachings are enforced and policed. The power to define and limit divorce rests with 
clerical authorities and attempts to contest this are resisted and disciplined by the church, even 
when such contestation comes from upper middle class members. 
This thesis also emphasizes the importance of gender as a site of identity production; just 
as the rural poor use gender symbols such as female genital cutting to articulate group 
so members of the urban middle class evaluate symbols and behaviors such as female dress, 
dating, and mixed-gender friendships to define the boundaries of their class community and 
locate others in a particular class framework. 
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 Yount, 0221, 0280. 
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Epilogue 
The majority of the fieldwork that comprised this thesis was carried out prior to the 
revolution that erupted in January 0200. However, these dramatic events and the complex 
political restructuring that followed them and is still unfolding are worth reflecting on, because 
they have implications for some of the ideas explored in this thesis. 
One key observation about the post-Mubarak era is the extent to which the status of 
Egypt’s Coptic Christians remains a fraught, controversial and emotive issue. Despite initial 
hopes that the popular uprising would mark a turning point towards a more inclusive national 
citizenship, the months following the handover of power to the supreme military council were 
marked by frequent outbreaks of sectarian violence.  
A new development, however, was the nature and scale of the Coptic response to this 
reemergence of sectarian tension. The political changes brought about by the uprising also lead 
to an opening up of space for political debate and participation. Critics of powerful actors are 
now more easily heard, and there is much greater space for all kinds of political action.
001
 As a 
result, there has been an emergence of a large number of new political campaigns, associations 
and parties, among them a number of Coptic advocacy groups. 
Samer Soliman discusses what he describes as a new element in Coptic activism 
emerging at a demonstration in 0222, when Coptic protesters at the funeral of a Christian victim 
of an apparently religiously-motivated murder took their protest onto the street, rather than in or 
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 Of course, powerful limits on freedom of speech and political action still exist, and various kinds of opposition 
are still regularly met by state sanctioned oppression, sometimes including deadly violence. Nonetheless, the public 
space is manifestly more open now than under Hosni Mubarak’s regime in many key ways. 
 85 
 
around the Orthodox Coptic cathedral.
004
 This new kind of Coptic mobilization – as citizens who 
are demanding equal rights from the state, rather than as members of the Church seeking either 
to defend it or to be protected by it – is has become much more common in the relative openness 
of the political scene after the events of January 0200. Coptic groups like the Maspero Youth 
Union and Copts for Egypt which lobby for religious freedom and for Coptic interests were 
formed largely by young “revolutionary” Christian youth. These young middle class Christians 
took part in the January/February 0200 protests to oust Mubarak,002 and in the aftermath of 
political transition, as sectarian violence continued to occur and responses were seen as 
inadequate, the issue of the status and rights of Coptic Egyptians came to the surface again, 
leading to the formation of these groups.  
They stand in contrast, and sometimes explicit opposition, to the official church hierarchy 
on political issues. The policy of the Coptic Orthodox Church during the January/February 
events was to stand fast to its pro-regime policy, and Pope Shenouda explicitly condemned the 
protests and urged Copts not to take part. Observing events in Mohandeseen, a center of ‘pro-
Mubarak’ support, I witnessed several protests in support of the regime in February 0200 at 
which contingents of Coptic priests marched through the streets in their distinctive dress, holding 
aloft pro-Mubarak banners. Following the exit of Mubarak and the transition to rule by military 
junta, the Church has generally maintained its policy of support for the regime and the status 
quo, although explicit criticism of protesters became less evident after it was clear that the 
uprising had captured popular imagination and would have a lasting impact. 
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 Soliman, 012-4. 
126 Interview with Maspero Youth Union member F., October 2011.  
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The Maspero Youth Union, by contrast, was formed by self-described ‘revolutionary 
youth’ and continues to lobby and mobilize in favor of broader ‘revolutionary’ goals, for 
example attending anti-military council protests along with mainstream revolutionary groups. It 
also has at times explicitly criticized the pro-regime stance of the church hierarchy, for example 
in December 0200 when the group criticizing the invitation of military council members to 
celebrate Christmas in the Cathedral.
004
 
 Other voices have also been heard in the new political space, including Coptic groups 
lobbying the Church to change its strict policy on divorce. These campaigns constitute direct 
challenges to clerical authority, and in some cases these were met with a small-scale version of 
the violence that the Egyptian state deployed to silence its own challengers. Just as the Mubarak 
regime had deployed paid “thugs” (criminal elements hired to use violent tactics to disperse 
opposition) during the “Battle of the Camel” in Tahrir Square, so the Church, according to its 
critics, seemed to have hired thugs with a dog to violently intimidate a small group of protesters 
demanding their voice be heard outside the cathedral. Policemen on the scene refused to 
intervene as violence broke out “insisting it was a purely Coptic affair.008 
 These kind of developments show that the categories and models that this thesis began by 
scrutinizing have not been swept away in the post-Mubarak period,  but rather, form an 
important part of a dynamic and fluctuating political culture.  New battles between lay and 
clerical elites seem likely to take place, and new modes of political expression are emerging 
which will have powerful impacts on the elements of Coptic identity and minoritarian discourse 
discussed above. The issue of access to divorce is creating direct and public confrontations 
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 Jadaliyya, “Copts Protest Church's Christmas Invitation to SCAF and Islamists”, December 02, 0200. 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/0809/copts-protest-churchs-christmas-invitation-to-scaf 
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 Rasha Sadek, “Stalemate” Al-Ahram Weekly, August 1, 0200.  http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/020090249/eg4.htm 
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between lay and clerical elites over key questions of whether the authority for such issues should 
be clerical or civil.  The “entente” relationship between state and church may also be 
reformulated as new political actors gain power, a new pope occupies the See, and perhaps as 
young, middle class Coptic activists, who bring to the struggle a “revolutionary” experience, 
seek to change the status quo. Sectarian violence is another factor which will surely have an 
impact on Coptic identity, as will the sense of state persecution engendered firstly by a persistent 
failure to bring perpetrators of violent acts to justice, and secondly – critically – by the 
experience of brutal state repression on 9 October 0200, when a peaceful protest against the 
burning of a Coptic community center was attacked by the army, leaving 04 protesters dead.  
 Ideas about gender continue to be important for constructing group identity in this 
transition period; public protests about rights to divorce and possible changes in personal status 
laws have reemerged as part of a lay contestation of the clerical hierarchy’s control. The stories 
of “kidnapped women” are frequent, suggesting community struggles over female members. The 
Maspero Youth Union, in the opening lines of a statement to newly elected parliament members, 
demonstrated the extent to which gender remains an important faultline for defining group 
identities: 
Gentlemen of the majority in the parliament, we address you with all respect. Will 
you rule us according to law or will you deal with us as a minority and Christians, 
and how will you deal with our women and how you will see their faces and their 
uncovered hair?” 009 
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Although it is still unclear what long-term effects the unprecedented political 
changes of 0200 will have on the Egyptian Coptic community, it seems likely that the 
kind of themes analysed above, such as the minoritarian trend, the competition between 
lay and clerical elites, the “entente” between church and state, the impact of class on 
categories of religious identity, and the importance of gender as a space of symbolic 
politics will remain relevant. 
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